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Abstract 
 
This interdisciplinary thesis examines the concept of sexuality through lenses provided 
by economic history, anthropology, and queer theory. A close reading reveals historical 
parallels from the late 1800s between concepts of a desiring, utility-maximizing 
economic subject on the one hand, and a desiring, carnally decisive sexological subject 
on the other. Social constructionists have persuasively argued that social and economic 
elites deploy the discourse of sexuality as a technique of discipline and social control in 
class- and gender-based struggles. Although prior scholarship discusses how 
contemporary ideas of sexuality reflect this origin, many anthropologists and queer 
theorists continue to use “sexuality” uncritically when crafting local, material accounts of 
sex, pleasure, affection, intimacy, and human agency. In this thesis, I show that other 
economic, political, and intellectual pathways emerge when sexuality is deliberately dis-
ordered. I argued that contemporary research aspires to formulate new ideas about bodies 
and pleasures. It fails to do so adequately when relying on sexuality as a master narrative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to Kevin J. Klein, my friend and domestic partner-in-crime. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
An education is an intricate collaboration among scholars, professors, peers, and friends. 
I offer my sincerest gratitude to all those who helped me, and encouraged me, and 
struggled with me along this path. I sincerely hope I was able to offer you equal support, 
or a few insights, or at least a few good laughs.  
 
First, to my dear mentor, Professor, and advisor Michele R. Gamburd: Twelve years is a 
tremendous amount of time to remain so patient and enthusiastic about my work! I thank 
you with all the enthusiasm I can muster at the end of this winding, and occasionally 
bumpy, road. You never fail to inspire and challenge me. I remain committed to honoring 
all your investments in my studies. Thank you! 
 
I would also like offer my wholehearted gratitude to: Candyce Reynolds (for always 
embracing my many ideas and efforts); Ann Mussey (for creating an opportunity for me 
to mentor and teach…you changed my life, Ann); Virginia Butler (a great teacher and 
mentor and scholar…I always think fondly of teaching our Archaeology class); Cherry 
Muhanji (you taught me how strong and loving a teacher can be); Connie Cash (for all 
the laughs, and all the help); Marcia Klotz (you are a great teacher and thinker…there 
was no queer theory until you taught me queer theory); Jonathan Walker (you always 
have the right touch in all your teachings); Professor Hall (thank you for helping my 
critical studies of Economics when I felt at a loss); thank you Mary King and Delys 
Ostlund for serving on my committee (and especially for your patience and candor); 
Leerom Medovoi (my sincerest gratitude for my assistantship and, of course, thank you 
for serving on my committee); Linda Hummer (I miss you and your radically joyful 
teaching);Wendy Morgaine (you picked me up at the lowest point of my early graduate 
studies); Robert Mercer (you are an amazing educator and compassionate man, and you 
saved my education…thank you); Margaret Everett (I am so appreciative of the helping 
hand you extended to me); Vicki Reitenauer (there are not enough words to express the 
joy I always feel in your company; I modeled much of my teaching on yours…and I owe 
you royalties!).  
 
To my friends and family: Henry George, Elizabeth Jackson, Erin McGovney, Megan 
McGeorge, David Berger (ECS! and so many hours of collaboration), Shelagh Johnson, 
Andrea Gorman, Kara Carmosino, Jesse Grant, Brent Lank, Denise McNichols, Jamie 
Villa (one mile at a time sister…thank you for everything), Amberly Damron (for all the 
good times sis), and last, but not least, to my best friend Rinda Joy Chambers (thank you 
darling). 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract.…………………………………………………………………………............. i 
Dedication.……………………………………………………………………………… ii 
Acknowledgements.……………………………………………………………………. iii 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Deployments of Sexuality.….………………………….…. 1 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………....1 
Setting the Terms and Methods....……………..………………………………... 9 
  Addressing Foucault: A Definition of Sexuality and Deployment.……... 9 
 Critical Discourse Analysis and Sexuality……………………………... 14 
 Theories of Subjectivity and Materialist Feminism……………………. 17 
Why an Interdisciplinary Study of Sexuality and Social Construction?.............. 20 
A Note on the Politics of Sexuality and Reflexivity…………………………… 27 
 
Chapter 2: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy and the Subject of Sexuality………..... 32 
 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…. 31 
Parallel Criticism: Critical Discourse Analysis and Economic Literature……... 34 
Classical Economic Subjectivity: Male, Rational, and Self-Interested………... 37 
Troubling Bodies: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy……………….……….. 45 
 Troubling Bodies: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy and Sexology.…….….. 49 
 
Chapter 3: Queering Anthropology……..…………………………………….….……. 64 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………. 64 
Anthropological Queerness…………………………………………………..... 68 
Thinking Queer Anthropologically...………………………………..……….... 77 
 Sex, Sexuality, and Economic Development Programs..…………………........ 82 
Queer Anthropology, Without Sexuality…………………………………….... 90 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion………………………………………………………………... 109  
 
References.……………………………………………………………………..…..… 111 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Deployments of Sexuality 
 
Introduction 
In this late-capitalist and neoliberal time, notions of a discrete sexuality circulate 
widely. The concept of sexuality forms a touchstone for sexual rights and narratives of 
sexual liberation. Sexuality is understood as the biological foundation for gay, straight, 
and other sexual orientations. Sexuality is conceived as a state from which springs sexual 
identities and sexual pleasures. Sexuality is assumed to be a naturally occurring 
psychological, biological, and entirely “real” human condition. Sexuality is then tapped 
to substantiate theories of deviance and morality and to justify therapeutic treatments, 
punishments, and separate “but equal” classes in contemporary society. Most sexualized 
narrations of contemporary human experience rely on the concept of sexuality and this, in 
turn, shapes contentious political issues about sex, affection, intimacy, and citizenship. In 
academic discourse, sexuality is used to make sense of diverse sets of cultural and social 
phenomena. It is necessary to ask, however, what is sexuality?  
In this thesis I will examine how sexuality should not be understood as a bodily 
and psychological reality, as it generally is, but should be understood instead as an 
economic philosophy about the body. I follow the historical critique of Michel Foucault 
(1978) to establish my critical and historical stance on sexuality. In this thesis I aim to 
contribute to a critical study of sexuality by more fully elaborating how economic 
philosophies parallel sexologists conceptual development of sexuality. In other words, I 
understand sexuality as a social system that addresses the body and its pleasures, but in 
ways that seek to discipline and order bodies. The concept of sexuality orders and 
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categorizes bodies through a system of self-scrutiny and self-discipline, and always 
against an ideal sexuality constructed as gendered and classed.  
Some will argue that sexuality was developed to pertain to all bodies, everywhere. 
Certainly the aim of sexologists (the so-called practitioners of “sexual science” 
developing at the end of 19
th
 century) was to address all bodies. They did so by 
constructing sexuality with normative ideals that, I argue, paralleled and supported 
economic thinking about bodies, desires, and pleasures. Classical economic philosophers 
composed a central character and subject in their work: a noble, rational, gendered male 
patriarch. This ideal later merges with neoclassical economic philosophers‟ interest in 
thinking about consumption, desire, and individualism. Sexologists construct their model 
of sexuality with these normative standards and measures. This is the foundation of 
sexuality, and against which all “other” sexualities are then compared as evidence of 
deviance and perversion. In this thesis I closely ascertain how sexologists relied on 
economic thinking, worked from these economic ideals, and instilled economic 
philosophies in their construction of gendered and classed concept of sexuality.  
My thesis on sexuality can reveal the implicit economic assumptions we engage, 
albeit unwittingly, when we use the concept of sexuality in our time. Namely, sexuality is 
a class-based and gendered ideal about the proper uses of the body, and sexuality 
addresses the body and pleasure in ways that parallel neoclassical economic ideals of 
proper consumption, proper desire, and proper rational individualism. I argue that 
employing sexuality as an analytical category severely limits other critical and material 
ways to understand bodies, pleasure, affections, and intimacy. Particularly, I will argue 
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that employing sexuality in cultural studies limits queer theorizing, other political 
economic perspectives, and feminist criticism about the body and its pleasures.  
After establishing sexuality as an economic philosophy of the body, I turn to 
examine queer theory and cultural anthropologists‟ assessment of sexuality. Queer 
theorists, and anthropologists employing queer theory, offer skeptical and critical studies 
of sex, gender, and sexuality. In general, they are critical of sex and gender studies that 
posit rigid trans-historical and cross-cultural equivalencies to sex, gender, and sexuality. 
In other words, queer anthropological theorists claim that sex, gender, and sexuality do 
not offer the same meaning in all times and all places. This is also the central stance for 
social constructionists: it is a historical fallacy to offer universalized and naturalized 
social concepts.  
Social categories, social practices, and social understanding do not mean the same 
things, in the same ways, to all people throughout time. Social ideas, like sexuality, 
should instead be understood as constructed in particular times and places. This 
perspective allows me to ask, again: What is sexuality? How has it been fabricated as an 
idea and ideal? I hope to contribute a more nuanced assessment of a historically and 
socially constructed sexuality as, foremost, an economic philosophy of the body. I 
believe this perspective is underdeveloped in social constructionist theories of sex and in 
queer anthropology. I find it necessary to fill in this gap, and I hope my effort contributes 
to vibrant queer anthropological studies. 
I offer both support and criticism of queer anthropological efforts in this thesis. I 
support the necessity for these studies, and the valuable contributions queer anthropology 
can offer to cultural studies of bodies and pleasures. I note how queer anthropologists are 
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satisfyingly skeptical of universalized notions of sex, gender, and sexual identity. Yet, I 
ask why this critical stance does not more thoroughly engage criticism of sexuality as an 
ideal analytical category. I criticize these studies for not taking social constructionist 
criticism more seriously. I accept Foucault‟s charge as fundamental and urgent: “The 
rallying point for the counter-attack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be 
sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures” (1978:158). 
I extend this “counter-attack” on sexuality by further developing the idea of 
sexuality as a regime of class and gender-based control and order, and in doing so I hope 
this helps develop new research strategies in queer cultural and anthropological studies. I 
am particularly concerned with this because queer theorists and queer anthropologists 
contend their research is necessary for a nuanced, political, and material understanding of 
bodily pleasures and affections. We should fully interrogate sexuality for embedded 
economic assumptions. Through illustrating the roots of sexuality in economic 
philosophy, I hope my study contributes to a more critical stance on the use of sexuality 
as an analytic category in cultural research.  
I rely on the distinction that Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) 
demarcate. They exhort social and cultural scholars to pay close attention to the 
distinctions between “categories of practice” and “categories of analysis.” Social actors 
and social organizations use categories of practice to make sense of everyday situations 
and create cohesive meaning and understanding in social relations. This does not 
necessitate use of the same categories for social analysis (2000:5-6). Brubaker and 
Cooper demonstrate this point in a critical discussion of “identity,” and use “race” and 
“nation” as additional examples of categories used as people‟s daily and lived categories 
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of practice (2000:6-8). This practical use does not necessitate the category always be used 
in analysis, however. For example, people will employ the category of the nation in a vast 
array of social institutions and social practices. This use does not make the nation more of 
a material, analytic reality even when humans rely on it as a fundamental category to 
organize and understand meaning. The nation is as much an “imagined community” as it 
is a place of borders and internal and external locations (Anderson 2006). I attempt to 
offer a similar critique of the category of sexuality.  
In the remainder of this introduction I will preview the remaining chapters, then 
further detail Michel Foucault‟s definition of sexuality and the concept of  “deployment.”  
I use Foucault‟s definition to begin and ground my study, but I further elaborate on the 
embedded economic philosophies. I believe this is a necessary elaboration on his 
criticism, and one that has not been adequately accomplished. I then closely set my 
interdisciplinary methods and theories: critical discourse analysis, theories of 
subjectivity, and materialist and feminist-based criticism. This is necessary because an 
interdisciplinary study, by design, has no proper disciplinary home. Though frustrating at 
times, engaging various disciplinary perspectives and methods can be fruitful, and may 
lead to new ways of addressing bodies, pleasures, affections, and intimacies.  
I will follow these disciplinary notes with a brief reflection on the politics of sex 
and sexual justice. In doing so, I respect a tradition of reflective thinking in contemporary 
queer anthropology and queer theory. This tradition values the writer‟s reflections on 
social position and influences; this allows me to reflect on why I think this study is 
necessary and important beyond theoretical and institutional rubrics. This helps me 
contemplate what I hope this thesis offers to the reader, political economist, and queer 
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anthropologist. It also allows me to share with my reader reflections on who inspired this 
study and reflect further on what this study may offer to those I care for and about.  
In Chapter 2, I compare neoclassical economic philosophies to the sexological 
development of sexuality. Sexology is sexual science development in late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century. Sexological theory and practice continues today. I explain how sexuality is 
implemented to rationalize pleasures and affections into the prevailing economic order, 
and is used to explain and then limit perceived threats to this order. Sexologists 
transformed discordant ideas about sex into an emerging theory of sexuality. Neoclassical 
economists make economic action and human behavior intelligible in ways that 
ultimately benefit the interests and concerns of a ruling class. The neoclassical 
conception of human behavior is gendered and classed; upper-class men are the 
foundation for neoclassical economic philosophy. Sexologists distill similar perspectives 
on bodies, pleasures, and affections; sexuality is imagined to account for all 
manifestations of pleasurable and affectionate behavior, no matter where humans reside.  
Any deviation from the classed and gendered norm is troubling to sexologists and 
they attempted to explain behavior in remarkably similar ways to neoclassical 
economists. I emphasize how sexuality developed as an efficient register of social 
interpretation, discipline, and control. In other words, sexuality is developed to interpret 
behavior of bodies within a particular framework that emphasized the necessity of order 
and control of diverse bodily pleasures. Sexuality is normalized with a Western, 
capitalistic ideal of a nuclear family, and with normative desire fixed to an imagined 
masculine, rational, consumer psyche. This philosophical synergy is especially evident in 
sexologists‟ attempts to form an overarching theory for sexual desire and sexual cultural 
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diversity for the entirety of humanity. This discourse also tightly frames sexuality to an 
assumed “natural order.” Accounts of human sexual behavior must circulate then, and 
now, through this economic philosophy of the body. Earlier in political economic history, 
Adam Smith (1909[1776]) famously proposed an invisible hand guiding labor and a 
market economy. Sexologists propose a similar apparition guiding bodies, pleasures, and 
affections—and they name it sexuality. I argue that this orientation mystifies the 
economic epistemology at the core of sexuality. This mystification is very troubling when 
sexuality studies are often assumed to shed light on political economic class conditions, 
and somehow counterbalance economic misery through the liberation of bodily pleasures. 
Throughout the 20
th
 century, sexual progressives and sexual liberationists argue 
that sexuality contained the repressed potential to overthrow economic miseries. 
Capitalism was imagined to repress sexuality (Marcuse 1966; Reich 1963) instead of 
producing it. Justifications for economic inequity often appeal to ideas of an already 
classed, immutable order, and sexuality follows with similar assumptions. Although 
sexuality is at times contested in 20
th
 and 21
st
 century social and cultural research, core 
gendered and classed economic assumptions remain. This continues to benefit a society 
and economy beset with unequal class relations and class discriminations—despite the 
supposed universal whispers of sexual freedom. Understanding sexuality as an economic 
philosophy is crucial for critical re-assessment of queer anthropology and cultural 
research.  
In Chapter 3, I examine how anthropologists and queer theorists contest sexuality 
as a universal frame for understanding pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency. I 
emphasize how certain anthropological and queer thinkers navigate the social 
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construction of sexuality while paying attention to the context of lived, material 
experiences. In other words, I demonstrate the dilemma of theorizing with social and 
cultural constructionist ideas while simultaneously attempting to account for social 
agency and social resistance. I assess the difficulty and rewards when applying social 
constructionist theories to the practices of everyday life. This approach sustains a creative 
tension for thinking about sexuality. I name this tension a “queer dilemma.”  
I conclude Chapter 3 by detailing queer anthropological efforts. Despite brilliant 
contestations of sexuality in this combined field of knowledge, queer anthropologists 
maintain sexuality in problematic ways. This constrains anthropological and queer 
holistic visions of sex and affection as materially expressive of social agency and 
culturally and locally specific. I advocate for a more thorough deconstruction of 
sexuality—a critical analysis that can emphasize the material limits of sexuality as an 
analytical category of research. I gauge other concepts that may be more imaginative for 
research: theories of carnality, pleasures and affections, queer sensations, and valuing 
descriptions of tacit understandings and knowledge. Sexuality, on the other hand, limits 
the development and use of imaginative research questions even when we profess 
awareness of the historical construction of sexuality.  
Queer anthropology needs to do more than gloss the historical and social 
construction of sexuality. It is not enough to point to contested definitions of sexuality, 
and then proceed as if this realization does not affect the ordering and maintenance of 
knowledge about bodies, pleasures, affections, and agency, in the first place (Oleksy 
2009; Altman 2001; Binnie 2004; Leap & Lewin 2002) . This is even more confounding 
when much of the work I discuss both creatively and lovingly builds alternate theories for 
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understanding pleasure and agency in lived ways (Povinelli 2006; Decena 2011; 
Valentine 2007). Queer anthropology is capable of addressing these dilemmas with 
thorough attention to the use and misuse of sexuality as a category of analysis. 
 
Setting the Terms and Methods 
Addressing Foucault: A Definition of Sexuality and Deployment  
Michel Foucault (1978) exposes the deployment of sexuality as a modern 
technique of social organization. He argues that sexuality was “deployed” to accentuate 
how sexuality was not “discovered” in the naturalistic sense, but instead emerges from 
the cross-fertilization of overlapping social discourses concerned with bodies and 
pleasures. These include discourses of the religious confessional, the ideal of repressed 
sexual knowledge (which he refutes), and the establishment of professions and 
government practices that made sex their object and subject of scrutiny. Foucault argues 
that sexuality was named and deployed to categorize, order, and discipline bodies. His 
effort notes that institutions manage and, in effect, dominate bodies. This management 
and domination works through material practices, but it also works through a production 
of subjectivities derived from categorical inventions. Through this deployment some 
sexual acts are named as perversions of natural orders, and social members are tagged 
with these sexual notations. He named this process a “perverse implantation” because it 
categorized certain sexual acts and behaviors as reflective of person‟s “real” self 
(Foucault 1978:36-40). He contends this process initiates our contemporary conception of 
sexuality as the psychologically deepest and most truthful part of the individualized self. 
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In other words, invoking sexuality encourages the belief that sexuality is a preordained 
and indispensable aspect of being human.  
Foucault was intensely concerned that an unwavering belief in this naturalness of 
sexuality ignores the social and historical processes creating it as a category, in the first 
place. It also ignores the constellations of power and knowledge that operate through it. 
Foucault encourages his readers to assess sexuality as a social technique of control that 
encourages self-discipline and self-scrutiny. This assessment contrasts with 
psychological, biological, and other Western, conventional models of human sexuality. It 
also contradicts explanations of sexual orientation as physiologically pre-determined. The 
human body contains no “natural” sexuality, according to Foucault.  
I follow Foucault‟s lead to understand the human body as inscribed with the 
discourse of sexuality and fashioned with its particular assumptions: what is erotically 
possible, what is supposedly natural, and what is essential to the human understanding of 
the self? This estimation of sexuality upends the established psychological tradition that 
composes sexuality as an internal, cognitive development built from of the gravels of 
sexual repression and following a predetermined and necessary path. It is important to 
note that this is not an estimation of sexuality that competes with other accounts of 
sexuality—it is the very basis for sexuality in the first instance. For this study then 
sexuality is a “name that can be given to a historical construct… a great surface network 
in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to 
discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and 
resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of 
knowledge and power” (Foucault 1978:105-106). In this way, Foucault notes how the 
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deployment of sexuality built over alliances of kinship that governed the cultural 
regulation of bodies prior to an invention of sexuality (1978:103-114). But the 
deployment of sexuality did not supplant cultural formations of kinship, instead it 
mapped over structures of kinship with a new ideal of “sex” as a category and in service 
of sexuality (1978:107). According to Foucault, sexuality is thus deployed along four 
major “privileged objects of knowledge” (1978:104-106). In other words, four social 
anxieties roused the establishment of sexuality: the “hysterical woman,” the self-
pleasuring child, the fertile couple, and the perverse adult (1978:105).  
Foucault was aware, as am I, that many will question why it is necessary to 
separate off sexuality from sex (1978:150-153). In other words, can sexuality be cleanly 
understood as an analytic category that simply organizes our appraisals of sex? Why all 
the fuss? Foucault emphatically dismisses this idea. He notes that sex should not be 
simply understood as some prior and universal human register of bodily experience. Sex 
is made socially intelligible, named, and ordered through the deployment of sexuality 
(1978:150-157). Sexuality is not a simple commentary on the capacity of human bodies 
to experience sex, and thus sex is not an inherent natural component of sexuality. Both 
concepts are historically and socially invented to interpret, manage, order, and discipline 
human bodies in particular ways. Surely, the body is biologically capable of pleasure, 
reproduction, affection, and emotional intimacy, but these are not dependent on sex and 
sexuality. The concepts of sex and sexuality are the tools of a regime of 
power/knowledge that made these notions intelligible in our time, and for specific 
purposes that I argue are worthy of more critical interrogation. The paradigm of sexuality 
needs further interrogation because of the limits it places on our ability to understand 
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pleasure, affection, and intimacy, not because it will forever help us further refine 
sexuality as a category of analysis. 
 I hope my criticism of sexuality foregrounds how it is constructed to catalogue 
and stigmatize human bodies and pleasures, but I also hope it demonstrates how the 
invention of sexuality channeled concerns about changing social relations, and thus 
reflected anxieties about rapidly transforming material conditions. In this sense, 
knowledge of sex and bodies “was not discovered so much as deployed, made to sustain 
new relations of power (between men and women, physicians and patients, parents and 
children), which in turn enhanced the credibility of the knowledge” (Allen 1999:71). I am 
trying to show that theories of social construction clearly violate paradigmatic thought on 
the naturalness and essentialness of sexuality. This violation demands a reversal of 
thinking: “For all of us, essentialism was our first way of thinking about sexuality and 
still remains the hegemonic one” (Vance 1989:160). Despite the challenge of this reversal 
and given the intellectual influence of Foucault‟s ideas, I still remain surprised how 
positivist and empirical attempts to establish sexuality (or one should say homosexuality 
and “other” sexualities) demand attention and allegiance.  
Foucault‟s monumental History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978) is valorized and 
consistently cited throughout the academic disciplines. But, it seems that his most crucial 
point is too comfortably forgotten: sexuality should be understood as a particular 
historical schema that organizes an understanding of pleasure and affection through the 
management and control of material bodies and affective alliances. I will add to this 
conception by focusing on the classed and gendered way this disciplining and ordering 
works. Feminist critics argue that Foucault often missed this vital dimension in his study 
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(Sawicki 1991; Hennessy 1993). I assess economic and sexological literature by focusing 
on class conflicts and class tensions within the development of this deeply gendered and 
economical sexuality. I hope to make this connection clear and show how sexuality was 
invented and refined as a commentary on the bodies of laboring classes, migrants, 
women, and non-normative affections and pleasures. Much good work addresses the way 
sexuality was invented to fit all bodies, and multiple thinkers assess the way sexuality 
was fabricated to address the pleasures and perils of bourgeois bodies. But I will 
emphasize the differential equation of class and gender in the invention and ordering of 
sexuality, and why this presents a profound dilemma for contemporary queer cultural 
research. 
Even in the intellectual aftermath of Foucault‟s insights, the analytical ideal of 
sexuality remains unfortunately and firmly rooted in cultural research. Even when social 
and cultural research addresses Foucault‟s pointed criticism, sexuality still remains the 
intellectual container for making pleasure and affection recognizable, meaningful, and 
ahistorical. In this way, I fear that sexuality still serves to justify social and political 
hostility to migrants and laborers, sexual “deviants,” gendered bodies not marked as 
masculine, and bodies that refuse to follow normative social rules. These valuable bodies 
are snared in class disputes that result in vigilante surveillance and piece-meal 
punishments. For example, perhaps this critical and interdisciplinary study of sexuality 
can help illuminate why some bodies are allowed to cross national and international 
borders for love, marriage rites, and affection, and others are not. It may clarify why 
contemporary age-of-consent laws punish people for affection that does not adhere to 
political standards of sexual maturity and proper citizenship. It may help provide further 
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insight into why HIV/AIDS prevention organizations were compelled to adopt categories 
like MSM (men-who-have-sex-with-men) in practice, and mostly abandon categories of 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual. I hope to critique why, despite the elaborate human 
complexity of pleasures, affections, and accounts of human agency, sexuality remains the 
primary backdrop in social and cultural research for negotiating the intricacies of bodily 
meaning. It is not enough to gloss over a “constructed sexuality” and then ignore what 
insights this realizes. I ask: what other intellectual pathways may emerge when sexuality 
is dis-ordered in this critical and necessary way?  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis and Sexuality 
I aim to critique the economic deployment of sexuality through a lens of critical 
discourse theory. Sara Mills (1997) discusses discourse in the following way: 
Influenced largely by Foucault‟s work, within cultural theory as a whole, 
discourse is often used in an amalgam of the meanings derived from the term‟s 
Latin and French and influences (a speech/conversation) and a more specific 
theoretical meaning which sees discourse as the general domain of the production 
and circulation of rule-governed statements. A distinction may be usefully made 
between this general, abstract theoretical concern with discourse and the analysis 
of individual discourses, or groups of statements produced within power relations. 
[Mills 1997:9] 
 
These power relations are understood as situated in the institutions that govern discourse 
and the relations of governance (Macdonnell 1986:3). As noted, questions and criticisms 
inspired by Foucault‟s work are common in contemporary intellectual thought. The 
critical methods he developed continue to warrant use here for several reasons. First, 
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critical discourse theory recognizes that discourse changes over time but maintains 
genealogical relations to the past. Second, new perspectives on present conditions compel 
re-examination of past meanings and help one ask whether current social orders and 
material distributions adequately address current material realities. Third, critical 
discourse theory aids in imagining new ways to live, form politics, and demand change in 
the present. 
 Importantly, the status quo in politics, in economic models, and in cross-cultural 
research agendas can be confronted with critical discourse analysis. This method focuses 
concern on the way political power relations maintain existing social relations. Using this 
lens, I am able to assess how notions of sexuality govern what can be said, how it can be 
said, and what is rendered as the possibility of truth within those structures (Mills 
1997:48-51). Michel Foucault makes clear that a dominant discourse does not totalize all 
possibilities of discourse, and a dominant discourse does not propose that a hunt for some 
absolute, powerful cause of terminology is useful: 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, 
any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and 
unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument of and an effect of 
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting 
point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it. [Foucault 1978:100-101] 
 
Demarcating sexuality as complex and saturated with obedience and resistance 
adequately meets Foucault‟s challenge to avoid assuming ideas have obvious, direct, 
material causes alone (McNay 1994:108). 
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This approach also helps me explain how “the discursive and the material are 
linked together in the symbiotic relationship of the power-knowledge complex” (McNay 
1994:108). Foucault traces formations of power and knowledge and their intrinsic 
linkages and mutual dependence: “It is to give oneself as the object of analysis power 
relations and not power itself” (Foucault 1994:339). So my use of discourse theory must 
account for power/knowledge as a productive force. All discourse is always interwoven 
with resistance. Productive power meets resistance and saturates the entire discursive 
structure, and all those subjects defined by their relation to it (Rabinow 1994: xiv-xvii). 
Foucault designates bio-power as the set of power relations expressed in the technologies 
of managing populations under the auspice of social interest (Foucault 1978:137-144). 
Bodies are then regulated, controlled, and dominated through ideals of public health, 
conceptions of public safety, and notions of social risk. Sexuality is exemplary of the idea 
of bio-power.  
I propose that discourse analysis can turn our attention away from an ideal that we 
can and will “get to the bottom of sexuality,” and instead offers new ways to think of 
human bodies in resistance to the coordinated deployments of sexuality. People rely on 
the stipulations of sexuality as a category of practice, but we can be more critical of 
sexuality as a necessary and always applicable category of analysis. I will demonstrate a 
critical discourse analysis on the economic pedigree of sexuality offers new ways of 
thinking and may prompt new questions about bodies, pleasure, and social agency. 
Through discourse analysis we can continue to “replace an Idealist philosophy of final 
emancipation with a nominalist philosophy of endless revolt” (Rajchman 1985:93). 
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Sexuality is just one of many social regulatory regimes interested in bodily acts, but it 
remains a massively influential one worthy of a revolt against its analytical standards.  
I hope this confrontational stance offered by critical discourse analysis endures 
herein. Contemporary regimes continually establish an opposite supposition that sexuality 
is an inherent and essential condition for pleasure and affection, and it also proposes 
sexuality as irrefutable material for a final emancipation from social, sexual control. I 
resist this interpretation and believe my work will help others resist this interpretation. 
 
Theories of Subjectivity and Materialist Feminism 
 A theory of subjectivity in its most compact form asks, “What is the self?” 
Answering this question is complicated after postmodern and post-structural 
pronouncements of a “death of the subject” (Mansfield 2000:v). Human subjectivity also 
represents discursive constructions—humans are always in the making of themselves. In 
other words, humans are always in the process of becoming. Critical discourse analysis 
provides a method to theorize subjectivity, and it remains a necessary anthropological 
analytical tool “where an idea of the cultural remains of value for a mediating 
experience” (Mansfield 2000:vi). In this thesis I work from a theoretical conception of 
subjectivity to provide “the inclusion of an important dimension of the social into the 
analysis” (Wuthnow et al 1984:242). Subjectivity is an expedient way to discuss the 
interlacing of power and knowledge and to assess the place of the human sexual subject 
in any regime. This cultural reality “is necessarily rooted at some level in human 
subjectivity” (Wuthnow et al 1984:242). This provides me with a tool to ask what 
“human” is theorized by discourses concerned with bodies, pleasures, and affection.  
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This tool also allows me to comment on the “dynamic and unsolved tension 
between the bodily, self, and social/political processes that, we hold, is the core of 
subjectivity” (Biehl et al 2007:15). I connect a theory of sexual subjectivity to the critical 
stance of materialist feminism. Theorizing discourse and subjectivity allows me to further 
assess the complications of lived, material realities. I then can rely on the materialist 
feminist criticism that these lived realities are inherently gendered and class-based. I find 
this contestation necessary to resist the regime of sexuality across disciplinary studies. In 
doing so I can ask, “What is the gendered and classed human sexual subjectivity—named 
sexuality?” Materialist feminist criticisms can conflict with theories of discourse and 
subjectivity, but at least materialist theories foreground lived realities of empirical human 
practice, labor, and life.  
This interdisciplinary effort seems to demand a new language entirely. But a new 
language is, at times, all that will suffice. Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) offers a similar 
invocation of language. He argues that language can control the consciousness and thus 
imagined social possibilities. Language, for Bakhtin, is an idiolect of class and social 
stratification. The term “idiolect” describes how language functions as a class-based 
prison for the imagination, restricting options in social thought and intentionally 
narrowing all thought into a monoglossia (one form, one thought, and one language). 
Though societies are by default heteroglot (multiple varieties of language) the effort to 
hem this heterogeneity in is ongoing. Only contestations of language will free one‟s 
thinking and open the mind to new knowledge which “frees consciousness from the 
tyranny of language, and its own myth of language” (Bakhtin 1981:61). This profound 
assertion about language, discourse, and social possibility is also illuminated by the 
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materialist feminist considerations of class and gender. Class constructs the idiolect and 
works to reduce social possibility and, literally, new thoughts.  
I employ the concept of materialism from Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean in 
Materialist Feminisms (1993). A materialist analysis of culture is “informed by and 
responsive to the concerns of women, as well as people of color and other marginalized 
groups" (Landry and MacLean 1993:x). This standpoint and method offers a “critical 
investigation, or reading in the strong sense, of the artifacts of culture and social history, 
including literary and artistic texts, archival documents, and works of theory.” In 
addition, I find materialist analysis can fit with discursive analysis and provide a similar 
“potential site of political contestation through critique, not through the constant 
reiteration of home-truths" (1993:xi). My use of class and class terminology like worker, 
laborer, and bourgeois I take from Marxist analysis. In addition “Marxist feminism holds 
class contradictions and class analysis to be central, and has tried various ways of 
working an analysis of gender oppression around this central contradiction…materialist 
feminism should recognize as material other contradictions as well… ideologies of race, 
sexuality, imperialism and colonialism and anthropocentrism, with their accompanying 
radical critiques" (Landry and MacLean 1993: 229). I engage my critical discourse 
analysis with this gendered and class critique.  
I purposefully use the terms pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency to 
limit the use of desire, sex and sexuality, and choice. I find these latter terms weighed 
down with contradictory and damaging meanings and histories. Specifically, the term 
“desire” summons much of the economic and psychological discourse that I criticize in 
Chapter 2. Equally, I avoid the notion of “love” because it presents such an expansive 
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opening of possible meaning. I leave it out entirely in favor of the terms affection, 
affective alliances, and intimacies. I take a cue from Charles Lindholm who argues 
against romantic love being a human universal (1998:243-263). The concept of choice, as 
well, parallels the ideals of economic consumption too closely to be useful for my 
argument.  I employ “queer” throughout this thesis. I do not employ this term as a 
category of specified sexual identities, but as a critical stance that works to destabilize the 
possibility and necessity for stable “sexual” identities. 
 
Why an Interdisciplinary Study of Sexuality and Social Construction? 
A project on “sexuality” engages seemingly endless crossroads of meaning, 
application, and consequence. Primarily, sexuality in most academic disciplines is 
assumed to be universally, socially, culturally, physically already “there”—a ground on 
which to build knowledge, contest derivative meanings, and perhaps argue for alternative 
ways of being. In other words, making an inquiry into the social construction of sexuality 
is not an original question or criticism in social and cultural research. The reverberations 
from this knowledge and “what to do with it,” though, remain contested in academic 
disciplines, research projects, and economic development projects.  
I ask why the deep and rich contribution of social constructionist thinking on 
sexuality has not sufficiently destabilized the concept in social and cultural research. I 
certainly imagined it would when I “discovered” it as a student. Why, despite the 
tremendous influence of social constructionist theories, does sexuality remain the de facto 
interpretation of the body and its pleasures? Why do cultural and social theorists continue 
to deploy the category of sexuality while invoking social construction theory as a frame 
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for research? It is far more comprehensible when the discourses of psychology, medicine, 
biology, sexology, and sociology invoke sexuality, since a supposedly natural sexuality is 
historically invented and cemented within these disciplines. But within other critical 
studies, why do thinkers simultaneously position research as social constructionist, yet 
ignore the blunt and limiting scope of sexuality as an explanatory structure? Even more 
confounding, why would some queer cultural research take a strident stand for social 
constructionist elucidation, but simultaneously offer sexuality as a meaningful heuristic 
and philosophy of the body? It is as if a scholar devoted to critical race studies decided 
that race was a biological reality, after all. Clearly, there is more intellectual work to be 
done and these concerns inspire this thesis. 
As a student, I traversed the de-territorialization and dis-orientation of a bodily 
sexuality across academic disciplines. At first, I naively imagined a different world 
emerging from the heap of ashy essences that social construction blithely burned through. 
I now must account for the limits of this type of critical engagement, as well as what 
further engagement may still promise. Even in the most critical studies of sexuality, the 
ideal that sexuality offers a necessary summary of pleasure, affection, agency, and 
material life remains. This realization is a particularly disturbing problem among research 
aiming to counter hegemonic social forces and debasing economic and political 
conditions. Contemporary sexual research may aspire to formulate other ideas about sex, 
pleasure, materiality, and human agency, but often fails to do so. I offer a criticism of 
intellectual practices that deconstruct sexuality only to counterintuitively deploy it, yet 
again, as a human universal measure. I hope to demonstrate that other ways of thinking 
about pleasure, materiality, and human agency are intellectually possible when the blunt 
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force of sexuality (and its limited capitalistic vision of bodies and pleasure) is eschewed. 
In other words, I want to argue that sexuality is a capitalist axis for normative ideals of 
gendered and class-based pleasure and embodiment.  
I select economic history, cultural anthropology, and queer theory for this thesis 
study. I do so because of the following considerations. First, I examine sexuality in 
relation to economic philosophy because of my concern with material inequalities in 
society. Second, I selected cultural anthropology for closer study because it generally 
attempts a holistic study of material conditions and human subjectivity (Roseberry 2002; 
Patterson 2001:103-164; Kurtz 2001:14-15; Wolf 1982). Both economic philosophy and 
cultural anthropology have been criticized for avoiding the topic of “sex” in research 
(Weston 1993, 1998; Lyons & Lyons 2004; Markowitz & Ashkenazi 1999; Kulick & 
Willson 1995). I note, instead, that close reading of economic and anthropological 
literature demonstrates a depth of theorizing concerned with sexed and gendered bodies. 
Economists and anthropologists do not necessarily avoid “sex,” but too often assume its 
coherent presence as “sexuality.” Finally, queer theorists explicitly devote their research 
to social constructionist theories of pleasure, affection, and social resistance, but queer 
theories are routinely criticized for evading materialist and economic reckoning 
(Hennessy 2000; Wolf 2009). Nevertheless, queer theories form a gratifyingly skeptical 
study of normative beliefs.  
In each of these disciplines, contentious debates about materialism, social agency, 
and bodies and pleasures remain ongoing. I find these intersections rewarding and 
productive ground for my thesis. My attempt to materialize pleasure and social agency 
and destabilize the category of sexuality in queer anthropological work is complicated. It 
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requires this holistic, interdisciplinary study. Although I explicitly acknowledge this 
interdisciplinary focus, I do perceive my study following an anthropological tradition, 
and I attempt to maintain an anthropological perspective throughout. 
The anthropological perspective prompts me to remember people are flesh and 
blood, cultural animals governed by forces often outside our planning and control. This 
prepares me to pay close attention to the material realities that govern human life. John 
Gray asserts in Straw Dogs: Notes on Humans and Other Animals: 
Today, for the mass of humanity, science and technology embody 'miracle, 
mystery, and authority'. Science promises that the most ancient human fantasies 
will at last be realized. Sickness and aging will be abolished; scarcity and poverty 
will be no more; the species will become immortal. Like Christianity in the past, 
the modern cult of science lives on the hope of miracles. But to think that science 
can transform the human lot is to believe in magic. [2007:120] 
 
I find this quote especially helpful for guiding my critique of sexuality. Sexuality is 
imagined to be an essential understanding of all human life and bodies. John Gray‟s 
assertion helps me realize that human bodies and pleasures will always remain too 
dynamic for any totalizing explanation. I also think this insight is pivotal for maintaining 
an active anthropological imagination and an idea of holism within cultural study.  
In undertaking this project, I endeavor to piece together the puzzle that persisted 
throughout my interdisciplinary studies. Again, why does sexuality endure despite the 
deep and profound criticisms launched at it? Can my criticism herein prompt some 
change in queer anthropologists‟ theories and criticism? How can we ask new questions 
about pleasure and affection that prompt changes in ways we might imagine political 
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agency and social solidarity? Is it possible to re-cast sexual orientations and gender 
expressions as evidence of resistance to debasing modes of life in late-capitalist, 
neoliberal economies?  
Lately, I am afraid that sexual and political theorists have been lulled into 
addressing diverse human affections and pleasures as simple distillations of capitalistic 
development and progress. Importantly, if sexuality is used as a category to orient sex, 
pleasure, affection and social practices, then what other possible interpretations are lost? 
Contemporary Western sociality demands allegiance to a tangible sexuality in identity 
politics, liberal philosophy, economic alliances, and registers of intimacy and citizenship. 
A study of political economy and sexual subjectivity in queer anthropological research 
can, and must, proceed without sexuality as the primal explanation for bodies, pleasures, 
and affections. I cull examples from my local community to demonstrate a queer 
anthropological perspective. I hope to appeal to the local reader, too, but I aim to 
demonstrate the need for critical attention to political economic and queer anthropology  
at home, as well as in other locations.  
In metropolitan Portland, Oregon homeless shelters were increasingly full after 
the last economic recession. Gender segregated dormitories were the prevalent 
organizational structure among the majority of shelters. Couples, whether in new 
relations, married, or otherwise companioned, were disallowed from sleeping together, or 
even in proximity to each other (Saker 2009). The necessity for safety in dormitory 
settings was made clear, but the assumption remained that a need for shelter trumps (and 
supposedly should trump) any affectionate alliances among those who needed shelter. 
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The dignity of affectionate relations was apparently dependent on the possession of 
property.  
Next, the Mayor of Portland, Oregon, Sam Adams was implicated in a 2008 “sex 
scandal” where he was accused of an affectionate and sexual relation with a 17 year-old 
male. Local newspaper Just Out refused to support the Mayor, although previously 
playing a large role in organizing electoral support. Local media coverage of the ensuing 
scandal honed in one theme: how “hurtful” Adam‟s act was for the local, “gay” 
community (Lang 2009). No local media (“gay” included) considered that a sexual and 
affective culture with affiliations of older men of middle-class standing, and younger, 
working-class men migrating to the city is an important, long-recognized, and even 
celebrated part of the so-called sexual minority community (Boag 2003). In any case, a 
17 year and 11-month old male high school graduate is not a world apart from an 18 
year-old male high school graduate. No one would speak to this in the local media. Even 
putting aside the historical amnesia that girds this “sex scandal,” the Mayor offered a 
typical US political apologia for a lapse in moral judgment that this altogether common, 
affectionate companionship supposedly revealed. Political fortitude, in this case, was 
determined by the demand for sexual piety among the heteronormative political class in 
this sexually “progressive” city.  
Another example: US West coast institutions of elementary education reveal a 
certain sexual piety. Debates about curriculum and textbooks and the necessity, or not, of 
including gay and lesbian historical contributions remains a controversial and divisive 
topic (Christie 2006). Both sides take aim at an unnervingly similar goal: to fix the 
identities of citizens into the regimented framework of contemporary sexuality. Whether 
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self-identifications and self-conceptions might offer a more valuable historical rubric of 
sex and social agency is lost in the drumbeat of contemporary politics; both sides demand 
retroactive historical readings for political gain in the present.  
Finally, I would like to note a personal example: across the years of my own 
collegiate study I received student health insurance. Meanwhile, dear friends of mine 
suffered from ailments from the common (broken bones) to the catastrophic (life 
threatening auto-immune disease). In either case, adequately caring for my own affective 
kin was made impossible by the stringent guideline that families are made through blood 
kinship, marriage, and domestic partnership alone. The chance to form a “family” outside 
of the structures of marriage and dependency is severely limited or non-existent. In my 
case it would require marrying or partnering with more than one person (clearly illegal), 
or claiming my affective kin as economic dependents (more legal, but a bureaucratic 
minefield). As my close friend noted with humor, “Maybe you could adopt me?” The 
rules of kinship reduced access to material benefits of health care. 
The shadow of sexuality looms in each of these examples. All are justified with 
particular economic, juridical, or social principles rooted in the supposed primacy of a 
presumably transparent and obvious rationale. They each depend, though, also on what 
Monique Wittig (1978) argued is the “straight mind.”  These examples expose an 
obliviousness and reductionism about pleasure, intimacy, and affection that Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick criticizes in the Epistemology of the Closet (1990). I hope these local 
“queer dilemmas” illuminate for the reader the contemporary practices that utilize 
allegiance to sexuality, and in doing so, limit other values, meanings, and possibilities for 
resistance. In other words, it is not only what “happens,” but what is allowable to note, 
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what is allowable to ask for, and what is considered politically meaningful and expedient 
in contemporary debates about sexuality. Sexuality operates like a looking glass that 
distorts complex, affectionate, and material life-ways into seemingly coherent, ahistorical 
registers of human subjectivity and morality.  
I hope to expose that in the looking glass of sexuality we are all “other.”  In other 
words, sexuality never captures the ways humans actually live; sexuality creates a portrait 
of classed and gendered normalcy that no one is able to summon, no matter how great 
their investment in its conventions. Certainly sexuality discourse is globalized (Binnie 
2004), but bodies, pleasures, and affection is always simultaneously localized.  
 
A Note on the Politics of Sexuality and Reflexivity 
This is a political project; discussing sexual politics means confronting material 
debasement and exploitation (capitalist, or otherwise). Assessing limitations to the range 
and capacity of erotic subjectivity furthers this aim. The question is no less pertinent 
today than in 1984 when Gayle Rubin proposed in Thinking Sex: Notes for A Radical 
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality: 
A radical theory of sex must identify, describe, explain, and denounce erotic 
injustice and sexual oppression. Such a theory needs refined conceptual tools 
which can grasp the subject and hold it in view. It must build rich descriptions of 
sexuality as it exists in society and history. It requires a convincing critical 
language that can convey the barbarity of sexual persecution. [1984:267-268] 
 
I offer a critical language here with eagerness, but no small amount of trepidation.  Even 
in this necessary call, Rubin relies on (and obviously deeply influences) a deployment of 
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“sexuality” to make coherent what I hope to describe—then disrupt. I argue that another 
place to begin this denouncement is to further the interrogation of the political economic 
and historical construction of sexuality, and then use this position to examine 
contemporary queer anthropology. I make this attempt so that I, too, may more 
adequately convey and denounce the barbarity of the many forms of persecution and 
injustice. 
Critical inquiries, too, involve questioning closely held beliefs and customs. Even 
as I introduce the outline of my criticism here, I reflect on the political and material 
ramifications of relying on sexuality and gender differences as categories of practice to 
carve more equitable modes of life and gather material support for my communities. An 
inspection of the practices where I also shape my relations, pursue passions, and join 
politicized communities is difficult and demanding. So why do it?  I defer to Lynn Huffer 
on this point: 
The story of queerness—as a story about madness—begins with the story of a 
split: a great division between reason and unreason. That split organizes 
Foucault‟s histoire—his history and his story—about forms of subjectivity tossed 
into a dustbin called madness. Queerness is a name we have given to one of those 
forms. Since the early 1990‟s, we—queer theorists and loving perverts—have 
tried to rescue the queer from the dustbin of madness and make her our own. 
Theory calls this gesture resignification: we have dusted her off, turned her 
around, and made her into something beautiful. 
But, somehow, over the years, the queer has become a figure who has lost 
her generative promise. She turned in on herself and became frozen into a new, 
very American identity. And if the transformation itself is to be celebrated, the 
final freezing is not. Getting stuck in identities that are often politically or 
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medically engineered, the queer is drained of her transformative, contestatory 
power. [2010:1]  
 
Pragmatic encounters with identity and injustice are central to sexuality research and 
pedagogy in contemporary, liberal education. Students and teachers continually address 
accounts of injustice and must respond to stupefying horrors enacted under the banner of 
sexuality. Students are then asked to assist in imagining a world where utopic visions 
should be suspect, but fervent praxis in aid of human rights, multiculturalism, and for 
liberal tolerance is ostensibly self-evident and sound philosophy.  
Friends, lovers, and citizens are tagged with sexualized and gendered identities. 
They are then expected to speak with a singular voice. Diverse knowledge and experience 
is condensed through the prism of social difference, and sexuality is assumed to be the 
closest position to a more noble truth. Accepting a normative sexuality is supposed to be 
the best path to social acceptance and social equity. This is a limited vocabulary of so-
called “freedom.” As Lisa Duggan reminds political activists in her critique of the gay 
marriage movement:  
As the army of lovers and ex-lovers we often imagine ourselves to be, queer 
people, perhaps more than others, might be expected to see marriage as a much 
too narrow and confining status to accommodate our elaborate, innovative forms 
of intimacy, interconnection and dependency. But rather than continue to expand 
the forms of partnership and household recognition begun by the LGBT 
movement in the 1970s, the marriage equality campaign has resulted in a 
contraction of options. [Duggan 2011] 
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Engaging a critical study of sexuality may offer ways to remove oneself from these 
idiosyncratic but terrifyingly reductive margins. Most often, one is obliged to remain in 
these margins in the name of social stability and in support of a naturalized system of 
sexual identity. Remaining, frozen there, is not acceptable to me, and thankfully not 
acceptable to many scholars and writers I reference in this thesis (admittedly, even those I 
critique for not doing more). John Gray measures our liberal dilemma: 
The task of political philosophy is not to give practice a foundation. It has never 
had one in the past, yet somehow the human species has tumbled on. The aim of 
political philosophy is to return to practice with fewer illusions. For us, this means 
shedding the illusion that theories of justice and rights can deliver us from the 
ironies and tragedies of politics. [Gray 2000:139] 
 
Sexuality is too often invoked as solid ground for social organization and social identity, 
promising a more truthful understanding of the self and providing pathways to more 
ethical and just societies, delivering us from “the tragedies of politics.”  
At the very least, the explanatory power of sexuality assumes a natural 
assemblage of pleasure and affection and demarcates boundaries for meaningful, moral 
engagement with others. I now find this assumption deeply troubling. I engage in this 
thesis study to find other pathways around these constraints for an “army of lovers and 
ex-lovers.” I strive to imagine other possibilities for thinking about political economic 
materiality of pleasure and affection, and return to practice with fewer illusions. This is 
challenging. I am reminded of Pierre Bourdieu‟s concept of doxa in an Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (1977). Bourdieu summarizes doxa as the status of social knowledge 
that appears as self-evident, obvious—as knowledge that “goes without saying” within a 
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society. It is certainly impossible to address every resulting social difficulty through the 
practice of critical analysis (shared meaning, it is useful to remember, is how sociality is 
built). Nevertheless, what I hope to address is why criticisms that already shattered the 
chimeras of sexuality do not rid us of its doxic charms. In doing so, I hope to honor my 
confidantes and communities with this study and expand on the hard fought gains the 
strategic use of sexuality offered to us. Now I hope to demonstrate a pressing need to 
limit its analytical application for the same reason. 
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Chapter 2:  Neoclassical Economic Philosophy and the Subject of Sexuality 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine how neoclassical economic philosophy parallels and 
affects the sexological discourse of sexuality. “Sexology” is another name for the 
scientific and psychological discourse of sex and sexuality that began in the late 19
th
 
century and continues to today. Neoclassical economic philosophy also began in the late 
19
th
 century and continues to today. I aim to understand the historical development of 
sexuality as a gendered and classed economic philosophy of the body. Sexuality should 
not be understood as biological or psychological precondition of being human, but 
instead can be understood as a social order emerging from particular social anxieties and 
class struggles. I develop this perspective to further contribute to a critical and historical 
perspective on sexuality. I also offer this as a reply to materialist feminist critiques that 
contend Foucault did not adequately develop gendered and class-based perspectives in 
his work on sexuality. I also hope to contribute to an interdisciplinary crossing by 
applying critical discourse analysis to historical economic literature.  
In this chapter, I will first address contemporary concern that critical discourse 
analysis does not adequately address actual economic literature. I aim to correct that 
herein. I then examine an economic human subjectivity that emerges in classical political 
economy. Classical political economists first establish economic precepts of a natural 
ordered economy, the “free market,” and develop the first notions of a gendered (male), 
rational, economic agent. I address these developments before turning to focus on the 
neoclassical “revolution” in economic philosophy and its overlap with sexological 
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discourses of sexuality. I will argue that this neoclassical revolution deeply parallels and 
affects the sexological invention and construction of sexuality. I do not imply that 
neoclassical economic literature caused the development of sexuality. I will accentuate, 
though, that sexologists construct sexuality with similar terms, ideals, and a remarkably 
similar subjectivity. I will note how sexuality can be understood as a gendered and class-
based capitalist economic philosophy of the body. Contemporary criticism of sexuality 
rarely accounts for parallels between the historical construction of sexuality and the 
historical construction of human subjectivity in economic literature. I hope to fill in some 
of this missing account. 
I am heavily indebted to the work of Lawrence Birken for first bringing the 
parallels between economic history and sexology to light in Consuming Desire: Sexual 
Science and the Emergence of a Culture of Abundance [1988]. Despite the brilliance of 
his work, Birken too hastily dismisses Foucault‟s emphasis on sexuality as social control. 
I will advocate that the construction of sexuality should be understood as a virulent class 
struggle over bodies and pleasures. Sexuality is developed to institute a vision of an 
economical and proper use of pleasure and affection against a normative sexuality that is 
gendered and classed. This critical examination will further illuminate sexuality, 
therefore, as an economic-capitalist discourse primarily concerned with instituting the 
role of a naturalized, patriarchal, and rational masculinity (first developed in classical 
political economy) but expressing the unlimited desires and pleasures that must be 
judiciously managed by a normative, upper-class male. Only “he” is capable of such 
discernment. Intensification of interest and surveillance of “deviant” and “perverse” 
bodies, pleasures, and affections are rooted in these class-based social struggles and take 
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pernicious form in the beginning of the neoclassical economic era during the late 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 century.  
Sexuality is a rubric of bourgeois desire for political and economic rule, and 
further justification for inequitable economic conditions. Yet the neoclassical era also 
represents a radical expansion of economic opportunity, and the development of 
individuated ideals of desire and pleasure for all consumers. I want to show that the 
sexological development of sexuality reflects this social transformation, but quixotically 
also serves to manage the anxieties this social transformation produces. Sexuality is 
maintained as a master narrative to silence and subjugate other knowledge about the 
pleasures and affections of the working classes, migrating classes, women, and other 
urban denizens. Sexologists work feverishly to catalog and document sexual difference, 
but also continually assert a classed and gendered sexual norm, even as its actual 
possibility seems to recede further and further away from a material reality. 
 
Parallel Criticism: Critical Discourse Analysis and Economic Literature 
Economic philosophies pertain to the “economy” but also offer insight into the 
paradigmatic intellectual and social climates of their time. Economic philosophies 
provide a looking glass into the prevailing concerns and conditions of material life. For 
this reason I attempt to unbraid a small section of the tightly wound rope of economic 
philosophy to understand the establishment of a classical and neoclassical economic 
subjectivity. Social constructionist theories of sexuality account for changes in social 
institutions, variations in ideas about human subjectivity, and map parallels between 
discourses. In contrast, some cultural criticism offers sexuality as a pathway to economic 
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and social freedom, and a way out of capitalist repression. This model of  liberation 
follows from psychological discourses of sexual repression (Freud 1975; Reich 1963; 
Marcuse 1966).  
Debates in literary and cultural theory critically engage economic terms. These 
debates employ and deconstruct numerous tropes, concepts, and metaphors shared in 
classical and neoclassical economic philosophies (e.g. economy, libidinal economy, 
circulation, desire, consumption, energy, and capitalism). Analysis of the economy and 
economic literature, however, mostly run in separate veins. It is as if two worlds exist: 
one in which economics is performed and one in which economics is critiqued 
(McCloskey 1998; McCloskey et al 1988).  
Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio reflect on the seeming incommensurability 
of economic criticism and economic practice when recalling a 1990‟s conference of 
cultural theorists and academic economists (Amariglio and Ruccio 1999:381-400). The 
conference attendees attempted to seek mutual understanding and interdisciplinary 
knowledge about active terminologies. They attempted to share new concepts to further 
enable Marxist and political economic critiques of the existing economy. The attendees 
asked how criticism of globalization and economic crises could proceed from shared 
critical strategies in both cultural study and economic theory. This conference instead 
ended with head scratching and frustration (1999:381-383). By attending the conference, 
participants hoped to avoid this type of disciplinary isolation, but it still emerged in the 
end (1999:385). In reflection, Amariglio and Ruccio narrate three important points that I 
consider before applying critical discourse analysis to economic literature (1999:381-
385).  
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First, economic debate in the so-called real discipline (academic economic 
departments) and cultural criticism do share theoretical orientations about the dilemmas 
of language and representation in the history of economic thought (for example: value, 
price, money, culture). This should be recognized more often. Second, both neoclassical 
economists and cultural critics establish and re-establish certain essentialisms in their 
work (establishing “capitalism” as necessarily pervasive and determining, tropes of 
commodity circulation, and tropes of circulating desire). In other words, both rely on 
certain naturalized ideals about economic human subjectivity to advance their arguments. 
Finally, Amariglio and Ruccio find more shared ground between economists and critical 
theorists: they both introduce a “desiring body” in political economic critique, and both 
share an interest in the subjectivity of the economic “man” (Amariglio and Ruccio 
1999:385-394).  
I detail these points to demonstrate that economists and cultural critics retain a 
commitment to a similar pleasure-oriented human subjectivity. They also address the 
subjective meaning of fulfilling desire (albeit to radically different ends). Both economic 
philosophy and cultural criticism narrate strategies for more effectual economic thinking 
and political practice. Economic literature is perhaps not the “sexiest” literature to 
examine but, with a bit of irony here, it may be the sexiest literature of all; sexologists 
import economic epistemologies to help construct “sexuality.” 
Popular parlance coins economics as “the miserable science” because economic 
philosophies must contend with material life and scarcity. Sexuality is often envisioned 
with quite opposite effects. Sexuality is popularly understood as a commentary on 
pleasure and affection and the capacity of the human body to relish pleasurable 
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experiences. In short, sexuality and economics seem separate, distinct, and incompatible 
but they are not. Relating sexual pleasure to economics is often considered unromantic 
and ruinous to sexuality (Tratner 2002; Baumeister and Vohs 2004; Francis 2008; 
Regnerus and Uecker 2011). This supposed comparative limitation aroused my suspicion 
and animates my study. Eve Ksofsky Sedgwick notes that cultural critics too often create 
paranoid readings of texts (Sedgwick 2003). I do not want to make this error. I offer a 
type of reparative reading that Sedgwick identifies and advocates: point out the 
nourishing surprises and hopes that may be generated in reviewing and claiming 
“sustenance from the objects of a culture—even of a culture whose avowed desire has 
often been not to sustain them” (Sedgwick 2003:150-1). Envisioning sexuality as an 
economic philosophy is reparative in this regard. 
I propose sexuality as a fundamental economic philosophy of the body. This does 
not diminish a vision of pleasure and affection as necessary and meaningful, but instead I 
envision a new comprehension of sexuality and economic history, and in turn, other ways 
to think about human subjectivity. I now turn to examine the human subjectivity that 
emerges out of classical political economy before devoting the rest of this chapter to 
parallels between neoclassical economic thought and sexological construction of 
sexuality. 
 
Classical Economic Subjectivity: Male, Rational, and Self-Interested 
Presaging neoclassical economic philosophy, moral philosopher and classical 
political economist Adam Smith recognized the realities and dilemmas of economic 
systemization. He expressed great concern for potentially debasing conditions of labor 
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and the development of ignorance among laborers. He expressed apprehension about 
capitalist money men being the “scariest, nastiest” creatures in society, if not nature 
(Pack 1991:147). Smith‟s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1909 [1776]) still presented a marvelous vision of the laboring human. The skill, 
flexibility, and productivity of the economic human are epitomized by a theory of a 
natural division of labor. He marveled at this supposed natural organization of wage 
labor. He celebrated the ongoing drive he conceived as simultaneously economic self-
interest and, curiously, self-love and social order (a theme Karl Marx later develops and 
criticizes). Adam Smith understood the economy as an expression of natural law and 
order. In similar ways, early classical economic philosophers drew deeply from the 
developing themes in the natural sciences. 
 Natural sciences detailed the body as well-organized and with specialized detail, 
but functioning in a physiological whole (Bicchieri 1988:104). This knowledge stood in 
stark contrast to the supposed barbarism of past ages. Economists begin to detail the 
market in similar terms. The economy is the epitome of good human work, but still 
expressed revealed natural orders. Much is gained by those who act in their natural self-
interest (Smith 1909). Smith admits, however, that his new science stemmed from his 
moral sentiments. In this regard, any variance that refuted the naturalized economy 
disrupted the “mental harmony” of the economist as moral philosopher (Oakley 1994:19). 
It useful to note that Smith‟s approach to the economy and capitalism “was strongly 
psychological and he emphasized the subjectivist aspects of its procedures” (Oakley 
1994:19). The economist aimed to reduce any disruption to this preconceived vision of 
harmony. What did not fit could, and should, be explained away. For Smith, and other 
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classical thinkers, the rule of self-interest revealed the interest of every citizen. This 
symmetry led to more efficient markets, more refined divisions of labor, and greater 
wealth for all. The invisible hand guided liberty, encouraged self-regulation, and 
advanced freedom as one and the same.  
John Stuart Mill later arrayed personal freedom as a buffer from a potential 
tyrannical state in his 1859 treatise On Liberty (1996). Mill argued that human 
subjectivity naturally strived for liberty. The guiding ethic is a Classical and Utilitarian 
one: moral virtue is determined by consequences of actions. Utility is the maximization 
of happiness through appropriate action. Human subjectivity acting in self-interest is 
already a benevolent social force. Classical economist David Ricardo developed a labor 
theory of value and imagined the economic human subject in comparison to “noble 
savages” acting in their economic interest (1960 [1821]). Modern people are similarly 
noble, and regardless of historical progress the self-interested subject still must contend 
with some type of scarcity. Accordingly, the economic human competes for scarce 
resources, even in a society of abundance (Ricardo 1960). The conditions of wage labor 
expressed natural principles of order. Any questioning of miserable labor conditions is in 
the unenviable position of questioning natural principles.  
Classical economists like Smith, Ricardo, and Mill inscribed an estimation of 
rationality throughout their economic literature. The moral philosophy of economics is 
the natural order of the market, and suggested a benevolent absence of conflict between 
self-interest and social interests. Smith, Mill, and Ricardo‟s economic philosophies did 
not require a theory of mutual or personal affection, only the concept of utility as a 
maximization of pleasure. But, all was not entirely well in this model of rational and 
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fruitful abundance, and self-interest as social interest. Laborers seeking wages were both 
necessary but a problem of population management and stoked fears about scarce 
resources. Wage labor also stoked fears about a declining patriarchal family household: 
“those who had fared well in the old patriarchal order were frightened by its looming 
obsolescence, but even those whose stood to gain were threatened by new forms of 
economic insecurity” (Folbre 2009:138-139). This patriarchal obsolescence was partly 
mitigated by the emerging economic focus on a gendered and classed subject: the 
individual male at the center of the classical economic philosophies even though women 
and youths were also working throughout the economy (Folbre 2009:126-128). 
Social theorist Jeremy Bentham (1961 [1789]) further developed a theory of 
utility. He proposed a felicific calculus to comprehend a seeking of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain. Bentham argued this calculus of pleasure and pain is the core of 
human subjectivity. He seemed to doubt the naturalizing totality of earlier political 
economic theories and he noted deficiencies in the concept of natural law: since a 
requirement of utility accorded the greatest happiness for the greatest number, some 
human subject must be left out of this greatest number. But Bentham‟s portrait of 
subjectivity posed the human as a rational agent and determined the social body as a 
necessary collection of humans acting in their self-interest (1961). Accordingly, humans 
recognized the truth of who they are through judicious economic activity. For Bentham, 
humans knew this to be naturally true and any attempt to undermine his theory of 
economic utility is explained away as a quirk of utility. Pleasure is sought and pain is 
avoided—there is no other subjective way.  
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A distinctly gendered male economic rational subjectivity was first commented on 
by John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. Adam Smith bestowed this man with little 
benevolence, however, by famously noting that the baker and butcher did not bake and 
butcher for their own pleasure but for self-interested reasons (Smith 1909:106-112). Mill 
offered a similar sentiment in the essay  “On the Definition of Political Economy, and on 
the Method of Investigation Proper to It” (1874 [1844]): if it was not for man seeking 
profit there would be no social order and no political economy of which to speak. A 
noble man seeks profits, and employs every opportunity to do so. The seeking of profit, 
the recognition of self-interest as social interest, and the valorization of the pursuits of 
pleasure are gendered as naturally male pursuits. Mill furthers this distinction when 
noting man is a “being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the 
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (1874:v.38). Importantly, the 
accumulation of wealth and the establishment of property rights were generally assumed 
to be male-only social domains. Women and men also advocated for female inheritance 
rights, but widespread development of new laws was not established until the 1850‟s 
(Chused 1983). The classical economic subject is decidedly male and in the pursuit of 
wealth. 
Perhaps the most famed of classical political economists is Karl Marx. He 
envisioned evolutionary economic orders advancing through historical eras. In Capital, 
Marx (1990[1861]) critiqued capitalism‟s bleak conditions for laboring classes. He 
argued that society is misled by the mystifications of capital. Labor value, a capitalistic 
necessity, occluded a real economic subjectivity with an alienating capitalistic one. 
Wealth is derived wealth from a worker‟s estranged labor. This is the delusion that 
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capitalism offered according to Marx. Plainly, a worker will never earn what labor is 
worth. The commodity produced is the desirable “object outside us” and desire expands 
far beyond what is necessary for survival (Marx 1990:13). This illusion distanced 
workers from their own vital life-force (1990:31-32). Real pleasure for the working class 
will always be deferred. Real pleasure can only be attained when workers are not 
alienated from their own productive brilliance and the products fashioned from their own 
hands. The consumption of commodities stands in the place of actual fulfillment. Marx‟s 
“commodity fetishism” explains the seemingly religious relationship between commodity 
and worker that results in an abysmal false consciousness. This relationship inscribes a 
“social hieroglyphic” that demands critical translation (1990:32). For Marx: 
Culture really has only one parent, and that is labour—which for him is equivalent 
to saying, exploitation. The culture of class society tends to repress this 
unwelcome truth; it prefers to dream up for itself a nobler progenitor, denying its 
lowly parenthood and imagining that it sprang simply from previous culture, or 
from unfettered individual imagination. [Eagleton 2003:8] 
 
Marx envisioned asymmetrical social and political conditions advancing toward continual 
economic disequilibrium—a constant social crisis. This vision of the economy and the 
human subjectivity contrasted with Smith, Mill, and Ricardo and even at their most 
pessimistic they did not compare to Marx‟s withering critique. 
Marx developed a potent and enduring conception of class analysis. He 
illuminated the politics of economics that ordered classes for profit for ruling classes. He 
engaged the ideals of revolution and resistance in significant ways that continue to guide 
discussions of class-based inequalities today. For Marx, history is the record of class 
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struggle. History remains dialectically material and teleological. The end of history is a 
communist utopia emerging from total societal transformation (Marx and Engels 1967 
[1888]). Because the natural subject of the economy is labor, labor alone contains seeds 
of resistance to ideological abstractions. But ideology entrenched class, justified the 
extraction of surplus labor value, and limited class consciousness and solidarity. Only the 
multitude of these productive forces overcoming the ideology of capital produces the 
necessary communist revolution (Marx and Engels 1967). For Marx and colleague 
Friedrich Engels, “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” 
(1977:155 [1845]).  
Life is class struggle until the end of history. Until then the noble male worker 
passes life resisting capitalism‟s shifting rationales for dismal class conditions and 
capitalism‟s uncanny flexibility in disguising his natural solidarity with other workers. 
Marx and Engels, despite their productive relationship, offered very little on the totality 
of workers in the public sphere and less in regard to gender; they emphasized the male 
subject like other classical economists. They offer even less on the strenuous, continuous, 
and gendered work of feeding, clothing, cleaning, and caring for workers in the domestic 
sphere. Nancy Folbre (1991) critiques this conception of the “unproductive housewife” as 
does Ann Crittenden (2002) when she asks why mother‟s work “was disappeared” 
through the social invention of the unproductive housewife and subsequent devaluation 
of domestic work of all kinds. They both answer the question by focusing on the 
development of rational economic “man” whose wage labor is imagined as the sole and 
proper source of value. Interestingly, Crittenden notes that women “won” certain legal 
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rights to custody of their children in the mid-19
th
 century, but at the cost of being 
perpetually isolated and devalued in the domestic sphere because of it. 
I detailed these classical economic philosophies to establish how prior to the 
neoclassical turn, economists already established an authoritative and prevailing human 
subjectivity. This human subject is gendered as male. He is a rational and self-interested 
social actor. This self-interest presented no social dilemma for these classical economists, 
though, because rational self-interest was already goodly and benevolent social interest. 
The male, rational economic subject could do no wrong. Any behavior was already 
socially interested behavior. This economizing male was self-interested toward pleasure 
and in avoidance of pain. Despite this celebrated vision of economic similitude, all is not 
entirely well as Marx noted. His vision of economic subjectivity is decidedly gloomier 
and haunted with exploitation behind closed factory doors (and this, in reality, included 
males, females, and youths of all ages). Despite this, the celebrated classical economic 
rational self-interested male pleasure seeker prevails to this day in certain degrees. 
Neoclassical economic philosophy builds on this vision, despite the transformations in an 
urban landscape offering very different material evidence of human life. I now devote the 
remainder of this chapter to assessing the neoclassical economic revolution.  
Neoclassical economists import the rational, gendered, self-interested, pleasure-
seeker and build an economic subject with all these characteristics, but with distinctly 
new additions that reflect a new accounting of desire in a newly realized consumer 
economy offering unlimited pleasures. Consumption becomes the central focus in 
neoclassical philosophy and is guided by male consumers operating with a distinctly 
psychological rationality and confronted with rational choices to make (Nelson 2006:18-
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21). This is the neoclassical homo oeconomicus. After detailing these subjective 
additions, I will show this economic subjectivity parallels sexological construction of 
another type of human economic subjectivity—sexuality. 
 
Troubling Bodies: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy  
The neoclassical human subject is embedded with earlier classical political 
economic theory of natural orders. The neoclassical human subject remains an entirely 
natural creature, expressing little evidence of social conflict or scarcity. Neoclassical 
economic subjectivity combined theories of bodies striving for pleasure and avoiding 
pain, measured by an internal felicific calculus, and exercised through judicious 
economic activity and consumption. This bestows an optimistic vision of human 
subjectivity despite being crafted in the science of scarcity. Despite any grave economic 
concern offered by classical political economy, naturalized ideals of economic 
philosophy ameliorated much of it. The economic order was natural, after all.  
After this neoclassical turn in economics in the late 19
th
 century, all males of a 
certain standing are assumed to behave in fully rational ways, because of their effort to 
maximize personal utility, and with a new world of markets and commodities at their 
fingertips (Nelson 2006:18-22). All necessary information for rational choice is assessed 
by this economic agent, but hemmed by scarcity of desirable goods. This is professed by 
neoclassical philosophy to still be in accordance with natural laws; self-interested 
behavior is still good for all.  
Neoclassical economist William Stanley Jevons (1957[1871]) further refined the 
concept of utility as a composite of characteristics dependent on various human 
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circumstances and human needs. Importantly, and central to the neoclassical revolution, 
Jevons instilled commodities into the felicific calculus and discerned the weighing of 
price and the consumption of commodities as an expression of pleasure warding off a 
now distinctly psychological type pain. Accordingly, Jevons‟ theory of value determined 
happiness as a necessary scaling of marginal utility through consumption. He notes that 
“perhaps our attention is more fixed on the utility which we desire to secure than the 
disutility from which we are trying to escape. Yet it would be difficult to deny that pain 
constantly attends pleasure” (Jevons 1965:9 [1905]). This scale proposed decreased 
satisfaction with every consumptive act—a scale of diminished returns weighed on every 
pleasurable act of consumption. Jevons avoided the complexities of individual 
expressions of utility. He quotes an English economist to note that “no man is satisfied 
with so limited a range of enjoyment” (Jevons 1965:8). He instead composed the rational 
man as an average man to base his theory and this average man. Economic humans 
(average “men”) are happy subjects to the natural phenomenon of maximizing pleasure. 
Of course, these average men were not the average laboring men, but the average upper-
class men of his time concerned with pursuits of pleasure. He makes distinct that even 
“immoral or criminal” objects have utility, and only ignorance would predicate utility 
being hurtful, but this is still utility if one is ignorant of the hurtful part of the thing being 
desired (Jevons1965:12). Desire is the key determinant of utility in this sense.  
Contemporary feminist economists contest this gendered and classed version of 
economic subjectivity (Duncan and Edwards 1997; Strober 1997:11). Kurt Rothschild 
also notes that a reluctance to abandon this model in contemporary economics is fueled 
by fear of being closer to the “fuzzy reality of man and society” (Rothschild 2001:450). 
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The fuzzy reality of man and society also realizes that no man, no human, lives in a 
gendered isolation. Classical economists established the gendered subject, and 
neoclassical economic thinkers continued with the assumption that all human economic 
activity pertained to male pursuits, despite the overwhelming and obvious evidence that 
women worked in the private and the public sphere. This is especially the case for lower 
and working class women who worked in both spheres. Folbre discusses how women 
were paid less than half of men during this time and “this discrepancy was explained in 
both natural and moral terms: women belonged in the home and should remain there” 
(Folbre 2009:135-136). Economists‟ notions of separate, pure spheres of economic life 
composed another economic fantasy that avoided more of the fuzzy reality of material 
life. 
Neoclassical economist Marie-Esprit Lèon Walras granted human subjectivity a 
communal “we” in Elements of Pure Economics (1954[1877]). But he continued to 
theorize human subjectivity as a rationally consumptive pursuit of utility maximization in 
a perfectly competitive market. Walras thus theorized a “purity” of equilibrium in the 
market. This theory proposed that prices fixed to utility (an early type of consumer 
demand) in a setting of perfect competition. Economic purity now expressed nothing less 
than the natural truth of scientific physics; the laws being formulated in the natural 
sciences seemed perfectly suited for the economic rationalities offered in neoclassical 
economics. Economic systems now guided natural energies and offered social 
expressions of natural physical laws, as well as the bodily ones offered in earlier political 
economic theories. “Pure” economics is the mother tongue of the neoclassical economic 
revolution, and the tenets are still used today (Osteen & Woodmansee 1999:22-25).  
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Neoclassical economists were not immune to the realities of 19
th
 century material 
reality. Despite idealistic visions they too were, to a degree, participating in a type of 
anthropological accounting of the economy, as well theorizing its natural perfection. Carl 
Menger offered that the human economic agent also struggled with forces of deprivation 
and overstimulation in capitalism. This compounds a theory of utility and rationality that 
delivers mostly subjective joy and satisfaction. In the 1871 text Principles of Economics, 
Carl Menger invoked these extreme economic situations to demonstrate how humans act 
within a marginal utility of diminishing satisfactions (1981[1871]). This is the beginning 
of a utility that exists in accordance with falling satisfaction: a diminishing rate of 
marginal utility. He even goes so far to note that “non-economic goods, therefore, not 
only do not have exchange value…but not value at all, and hence no use value” (Menger 
1981:118). In this sense, only economic commodities can be valued in any real sense. 
Menger‟s ideal presented another diminution of the domestic sphere, and 
disregarded other types of economic exchange. Menger then determined that rational 
economic men “will prefer pleasure of longer duration to pleasures of shorter duration, 
and with the same duration, pleasures of greater intensity to pleasures of less intensity” 
(Menger 1981:123). Consumption is the ultimate point of the economy and of a 
pleasurable life. The consumer of fine things with fine tastes is the radical new 
individualized center of the consumptive economy. The holism of production erodes into 
this individual consumer. The neoclassical system thus “implied that desire was the only 
criterion for social agency” (Birken 1988:35). Unfortunately this does not carry over in 
the same way to sexological discourse. Desire in the sexological scene comes to represent 
a deviant distortion of social agency because of the multiplicity of possible desires. 
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Menger also focused on varying human needs, subject to the individual and not 
solely based on objective forms of universal pleasure. Only human desires dictate any 
value as “human knowledge of the different degrees of importance of satisfaction of 
different needs and of separate acts of satisfaction is also the first cause of differences in 
the values of goods” (Menger 1981:128[1871]). This subjective theory of value marked a 
further transformation in economic philosophy. And Menger provided further 
philosophical sustenance for the neoclassical model of consumption as only necessary 
locus of economic energy. Menger also imagined this capitalistic order as an evolutionary 
form of development (he termed it spontaneous). The economy accordingly was an 
evolutionary order and thus subject to some scarcity and conflict. His philosophy then 
composed a subjectivity that was decidedly psychological in its orientation, and 
composed of individual wants, needs, and desires but hemmed by this evolutionary 
realization that all could not be met. Bentham‟s calculus first provided the framework for 
a psychological wedding of desire with utility (Birken 1988) and Menger built his 
philosophy out of this. 
 
Troubling Bodies: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy and Sexology 
During the late 19
th
 century, hundreds upon thousands of bodies were arriving in 
urbanizing and industrializing centers to pursue work. This sparked another intellectual 
project: sexology. During the neoclassical economic transformation, sexologists also 
constructed a portrait of human subjectivity that paralleled economic philosophy in 
startling and, I suggest, not coincidental ways. Despite the marvelous testaments of 
economic social order in classical and neoclassical economic philosophy, the urban 
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spaces were teeming and chaotic. I compare the themes within sexology and neoclassical 
philosophy to demonstrate similar constructions of subjectivity. Sexuality should thus be 
understood as a 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century economic philosophy of the body. Sexologists 
also work, though, to disrupt and subjugate other knowledge of pleasure and affection 
emerging from the same economic milieu. 
Sexologists Sigmund Freud, Havelock Ellis, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Magnus 
Hirschfeld, and Iwan Bloch all developed a sexological subjectivity during the 19th and 
20th century with the belief that they were discovering pure, natural essences applicable 
to all human beings. Krafft-Ebing‟s staggeringly influential work Psychopathia Sexualis 
(1965[1894]) composed human sexual subjectivity as a striving male “achieving” a 
natural purity in heterosexuality (after a few perverted bumps in the road, of course). 
Females, on the other hand, were less striving, at least not in the same sense: “A 
particular species of excessive sexual urge may be found in females in whom a most 
impulsive desire for sexual intercourse with certain men imperatively demands 
gratification” (Krafft-Ebing 1965:5). Sexuality is the terrain of a male, individual, 
rational pursuit of pleasure in a changing social milieu. This model man is the 
mythologized “benevolent patriarch” within economic subjectivity (Strassman 1993:54-
68) and forms the foundation of sexologists‟ construction of sexuality. It is useful to ask 
how sexologists composed an ideal sexuality, all the while locating and mining evidence 
of perversions, sexual deviations, and cultural anomaly. Sexologists gathered evidence 
that pointed to a vast and rich milieu of sexual cultures, yet a natural, stable, and rational 
subjectivity is simultaneously constructed to render any other interpretation moot. 
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A classed and gendered portrait of this economic milieu is offered by John D‟ 
Emilio in “Capitalism and Gay Identity” (1997). European and American household 
economies underwent major alterations during the 19th and 20th century. The industrial 
capitalist mode of production transformed the local, agriculturally based household 
member into an urban-bound wage earner. D‟Emilio emphasizes that through 
proletarianization, urbanization, and the expansion of wage labor, an “ideology of family 
life and the meaning of heterosexual relations” are profoundly altered 
(D‟Emilio1997:170). He notes that household economies relied on the reproduction of 
new members for agricultural and household labor. Sexual expression was accordingly 
coupled to marriage. In earlier Puritan American communities laws restricted anyone 
from living outside family households (D‟Emilio1997:170). A notion of “heterosexual 
expression [as] means of establishing intimacy, promoting happiness, and experiencing 
pleasure” first develops within the demands of an industrializing economy.  
This economy also provided the space and conditions for identities based on 
same-sex sex affection to develop (D‟Emilio1997:171) as well as other gendered, 
classed, and diverse forms of pleasure and affection. In other words, sexual behavior that 
constitutes identity today did not always ground identity in the past. Jonathan Ned Katz 
notes that heterosexual relations are not even yet “heterosexual” in the mid-19th century. 
The very concept of  hetero- and homo- distinctions based on sex acts, not to mention 
identities, are not coined until writer and social reformer Karl Maria Kertbeny includes 
them in a private letter in 1868 (Katz 1997:177). It is essential to note this decade is also 
the marker of the neoclassical philosophical transformation.  
52 
 
D‟Emilio and Katz‟s historical analyses point to a historical emergence of a 
“normal” sexuality. They remind readers that heterosexuality was constructed and 
implemented to help interpret and re-organize social life undergoing these profound 
material transformations. Despite the rapid implementation of heterosexuality as normal 
during this time, it carried the stigma of deviancy as “morbid perversion” well into the 
early 20
th
 century (Katz 1997:177-178). That is to say, sex based on heterosexual 
pleasure could also be a moral perversion if there was too much of it. This idea eroded as 
other deviancies piqued the interest of sexologists. Foremost, though, sexologists 
grappled with composing a philosophical basis for a universal and natural theory to 
ground their discoveries of divergent sexual cultures and divergent forms of pleasure and 
affection. They “discovered” sexuality. 
 Sexologists, as much as economists, were observing radically different ways of 
life (and sexual cultures) within the industrializing and urbanizing spaces, and they both 
attempted to account for this diversity with an economic subjectivity in mind. As Iwan 
Bloch considered in the disturbingly named Anthropological Studies in the Strange 
Sexual Practices of all Races in All Ages: Ancient and Modern, Oriental and Occidental, 
and Primitive and Civilized (1933), almost every person has variations of desire and he 
worried that “sexual relations usually considered normal, as in these too we can 
demonstrate a progressive need for stronger stimulant” (Bloch 1933:167). This is 
strikingly similar to the estimation of an economic diminishing utility. Apparently, 
though, this is more of a problem among “all places in which great numbers of people are 
crowded together furnish conditions conducive to the genesis of transgressions and 
aberrations of a hetero- and homosexual character” (1933:176). Importantly for my 
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emphasis on class Bloch continues to note that in “worker‟s tenements, where often a 
whole family lives in one room, the children early have an opportunity to witness scenes 
of the grossest vice, especially where there are also lodgers” (1933:176). Bloch continues 
to cast his net even among the middle and upper classes, by noting that “sexual 
perversion, especially of a homosexual nature, occurring later in life, can be traced to the 
years spent in boarding school” (Bloch 1933:178). Bloch ignored that there are few other 
options in boarding school for other conduits of pleasure and affection, but he noted that 
at least these are artificially fostered compared to other more inborn perversions, like 
among basically every other culture and “race” on earth which he details with relish. 
Like Jeremy Bentham, who examined concerns about the ironic deficiencies of 
natural laws, sexologist Richard Von Krafft-Ebing surmised that natural sexual and 
gender deficiencies required political intervention to achieve a more natural state of 
humankind. Krafft-Ebing proposes in Psychopathia Sexualis (1965 [1894]) that all sexual 
abnormalities must be rooted in a similar pathological-psychological continuum and must 
be confronted in an attempt rehabilitate resulting immoralities. Sexuality, Krafft-Ebing 
noted, is the “most powerful factor in individual and social existence” (1965:3). Bentham 
argued that any effort, thoughtful or otherwise, to discount or dismiss the principle of 
utility among individuals is futile—for any effort to diminish its truth is evidence of its 
natural truth (Bentham 1961:19-21[1789]). For Krafft-Ebing, any dismissal of the power 
of sexuality over men dismissed a necessary moral heterosexuality. He argued that moral 
heterosexuality was necessary for taming animal passions. Without it there is no 
foundation for civilization. Sexual subjectivity holds the seeds of civilization and chaos. 
His construction of normal sexual subjectivity required manly, judicious, constant, 
54 
 
felicific oversight, just like the economic subjectivity of classical and neoclassical 
philosophy. Women were clearly of less concern, as Krafft-Ebing decided women are by 
“nature not as sensual and certainly not as aggressive in the pursuit of sexual needs” 
(1965:262[1894]). In either case, even love is suspicious because “purely sensual love is 
never true or lasting, for which reason first love is, as a rule, but a passing infatuation a 
fleeting passion” (Krafft-Ebing 1965:7). Sensual pleasure was to be limited as it 
instigated the very desires that were already coursing through psychology and sexology, 
borrowed from neoclassical philosophies, and paralleled new ideas about an economy 
filled with consumer goods that must all be desired. The economy now depended on it. 
Desire may be natural, but is also naturally dangerous without a gendered and classed 
intellect to govern it. 
For many early sexologists, rational and judicious men provided the necessary 
and proper oversight of sexuality. The difference between men and women is stark: “In 
the sexual demands of man‟s nature will be found the motives of his weakness toward 
women. He is enslaved by her, and becomes more and more dependent on her as he 
grows weaker, and the more he yields to sensuality” (Krafft-Ebing 1965:9). This 
resistance to sensuality was assumed to be a natural duty over less-worthy men, women, 
and children. If men are incapable or unwilling, then women may play some role and 
prove their “worth.” Ann Laura Stoler notes how the “triumph of the rational bourgeois 
man in colony and metropole” rendered both women and non-Europeans into a category 
governed not by rationality, but by animal passions (1995:128-130). Yet women were 
still expected to oversee men of their “race” from mingling with native women. This 
certainly illuminates sexual subjectivity as a type of social control; as Stoler remarks on 
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the colonies, “more than half the European male population were cohabiting  out of 
wedlock with native women in the late 19
th
 century” (1995:129). These colonial 
encounters produced social pressures at home that roused sexologists‟ efforts. 
This pattern offers a critical insight into the sexologists‟ effort to account for all 
sex behavior coordinated by a single, universal, and naturalizing (and anthropological 
logic in Iwan Bloch‟s cases): “Time and again, one finds sexological writing—all the 
way from the 1890s to today—seeking to produce some everlasting truth about the sexual 
capacity of human beings” (Bristow 2011:15). Accordingly, a rational man acting in his 
own best interest while searching out and weighing the pleasures in life, but with 
diminishing returns, provides sexology with a compelling psychological composite to 
building the sexual subject. In addition it offered sexologists a normative model from 
which to theorize all other pleasures and affections as perversion, inversions, and 
deviations. 
So, despite, the newly available bodies, desires for commodities, evidence of 
various pleasure and affections, sexologists and economists were both keen to develop an 
interior, psychological world to justify limits and order on the dissonance, diversity, and 
contradictions in material reality. John F. Tomer details how the economic man remained 
“self-interested, rational, unchanging, separate, and unreflective” (2001:281). His 
assessment could just as well be detailing the sexological development of normative 
sexuality. 
Sexologists demonstrate an intense interest in punitive and rehabilitative sanctions 
for sexual, laboring “others” as much as they demonstrate naturalist interest in creating 
taxonomies of sexual perversion and normalcy. Effort to comprehend and systematize 
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behaviors, cultures, and acts is not a benign 19
th
 and 20
th
 century naturalistic exercise. 
Accordingly, sexologists do not simply hope to find order in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century 
urban landscape; they endeavor to enforce a capitalist social order as well. Neoclassical 
economists, at least, argued the economy was a natural order; sexologists went one 
further and worked to warn, display, and cajole upper-class men and some women into a 
perceived natural order that was apparently falling apart before their discerning eyes. As 
with any attempt at social order and control, these efforts have mixed results.  
Sexologists like Krafft-Ebing (1965[1894]), Bloch (1933, 1936[1909]), and 
Hirschfeld (2000[1919]) already speculated a sexualized capitalistic human subject when 
they developed a sexual subjectivity. They enforced a masculinist, familial, and 
psychological framing of the sexual subject through the newly refined category of 
sexuality. The sexological “scientific” endeavor can and should be understood as a class 
struggle. The master narrative of sexuality subsumes other pleasures and affections that, 
as Katz (1997, 2001) and D‟Emilio (1997) noted, were as “natural” as the environments 
they were taking shape in. 
Differences in class standings made bodies available for sexological discernment. 
The evidence of “perversions” was ascertained by the upper and bourgeois intellectual 
classes simply through observing the different cultural traditions and practices of the 
working classes. This was all the evidence they needed to recoil in horror. Police, 
reformers, doctors, and politicians were armed with the incipient knowledge from 
sexological discourse to justify sanctions, class punishments, and other efforts of 
confinement or rehabilitation. Of course “deviants” and those who occupied the upper 
classes were not immune to each other. Upper classes certainly mingled in the blue hour 
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of twilight and in the back alleys of clubs, bars, and other establishments of so-called ill-
repute. 
The intellectuals of modernity were deeply concerned with the ability of social 
science to find parallels to the “laws” of natural science (Hobsbawm 1975) as much as 
economists. Sexologists imagined that understanding natural foundations bodily and 
behavioral differences (which would encapsulate gender differences and sexual behavior 
in this time) were the keys to unlocking and controlling the diverse sexual phenomena 
observed and reported in the urban landscape. All the while, upper class and bourgeois 
intellectuals were already haunted by notions of their own failed moralities. This duality 
is described by Eric Hobsbawm in The Age of Capital 1848-1875:  
The duality of matter and spirit implied a hypocrisy which unsympathetic 
observers considered to be not merely all-pervasive but a fundamental 
characteristic of the bourgeois world. Nowhere was this more obvious, in the 
literal sense of being visible, than in the matter of sex. This is not to imply that the 
mid-nineteenth-century (male) bourgeois (or those who aspired to be like him) 
was merely dishonest, preaching one morality while deliberately practicing 
another, though patently the conscious hypocrite is more often to be found where 
the gap between the official morality and the demands of human nature is 
unbridgeable, as in this period it often was. [1975:232-233]  
 
Efforts to bridge the gap between the so-called private moralities and the public 
experiences of bourgeois male citizens certainly stimulated the discourses that took sex as 
the object of inquiry. Sex, and the bodies performing its variations in streets, bars, clubs, 
balls, and houses of prostitution (Katz 1997) provided the empirical evidence necessary, 
and indeed a moral necessity for gentlemen and gentlewomen to support sexual and 
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economic sanctions, whether they participated in “deviant" sex or not. This class struggle 
fueled sexual sanctions and punishments, and these were imposed on diverse working 
class sexual cultures in cities and towns across the US, Europe, and the colonies and 
under various guises (Boag 2003; Stoler 1995; Jackson 1996; D‟Emilio1997; Halperin 
1990; Katz 1997, 2001; Chauncey 1994; Rupp 2002; Faderman 1991). It is evident in 
Bloch‟s assertion that many alarming possibilities are instigated by the “sexual impulse.” 
But these sexual potentials can be judiciously resisted and elevated from the “transient” 
and “casual” to limit the poisoning of the “amatory life of our time; let us destroy all the 
germs of degeneration, and let us imprint upon our sexual conscience three words—
health, purity, responsibility” (1936:765[1909]).  
Certainly pleasures and affections and bodies are organized and managed in other 
places and other times. But sexuality is a unique construction: sex as a behavior or simple 
capacity for pleasure is transformed into ontological categories of personhood and 
deviancy during the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century through sexological efforts (Foucault 
1978; Cameron and Kulick 2003:19-24; Seidman 2003; Rubin 1984; Halperin 1990; 
Weeks 1991; Katz 1997:177-180). This emergent discourse should be understood as 
precipitated by class anxiety and class struggle. I remind my reader that sexuality is 
highly suited for class control because the rationale that discursively operates within it 
already incorporates a class-based economic subjectivity. Yet, sexuality was socially 
imagined to be distinct from economic consideration. Feminist thinker Margaret Jackson 
attempts to understand the sexological literature of this time and comes to a similar 
conclusion with gendered implications: 
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Sexology was about much more than legitimizing myths; it was also about 
constructing a model of sexuality which purported to be objective and 
scientific but in fact reflected and promoted the interests of men in a 
sexually divided society. [1987:52] 
 
Similar to racial typologies also circulating (Somerville 1994) during this new economic 
order, the supposed natural laws for bodily and behavioral differences reinforced classed 
political concerns and a maintenance of power through the new vector of sexuality.  
Sexuality came to serve as a key determinant in understanding people‟s relation to 
nature, to each other, and to the social whole. Sexologists offered then a vector for 
determining “truth” about pleasure, affection, and agency divorced from economic 
consideration (Birken 1988:7). Sexuality encompassed a new phase of naturalized 
individualism but also compatible with technologies that enforce certain relations and 
affections. “In this context, sexology takes on a particularly titanic significance because it 
appears as the last line of defense against a universal democratization and dissolution of 
the social order” (Birken 1988:13). After Birken establishes this point, he retreats by 
critiquing Foucault for a failure to recognize the “two-sided and contradictory nature” of 
the social control exercised by sexual science (1988:14). This analysis is specious given 
that Foucault‟s entire oeuvre of work painstakingly details the ongoing production of 
power through constellation-like dimensions of discursive production (Foucault 1978; 
Weeks 1991:162-166; Foucault, Martin, et al 1988:126-131). Discourse may censor, but 
only with the aim of producing other refined techniques for inquiring about sex—this is 
the open secret of sexuality in Western thought. Sexual discourse is not repressive, it is 
productive. 
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Sexuality provided class-based intellectual weaponry to enforce certain relations 
between social members for the benefit of ruling classes. Sexologists constructed sexual 
subjectivity with economic subjectivity to help reconcile “the contradictory structure of 
an ideology simultaneously embodying both productivist and consumerist values” 
(Birken 1988:40). In other words, sexuality covers contradictory evidence emerging from 
a materially changing society. Cultural bodies, pleasures, and affections also expressed 
these changes in dynamic sexual cultures. Sexologists understood sexuality to naturally 
order energy, needs, and impulses. This was considered normal for male, heterosexual, 
rational patriarchs, but intensely problematic for everyone else.  
Sexologist Havelock Ellis imagined sexual impulses moving along three 
trajectories, “the immediate discharge of masturbation…discharge of so-called perversion 
…and the long delayed discharge he believed inherent in normal or heterogenital love” 
(Birken 1988:42). This gave a new meaning to “waiting until marriage.” A metaphor of 
hydraulic desire dominated his account of sexuality. Masturbation is not ideal, so if 
consumption is not realized then symptoms of perverse sexuality emerge. A symptomatic 
sexuality is anything other than a normal mapping of economic masculinity. Theories of  
perverse and deviant pleasure were assumed by sexologists to carry natural frustrations 
emerging from a scarcity of desirable objects to consume. Deviant affections are cases of 
falling marginal satisfaction. Deviant pleasures are signs of failed utility and indicative of 
failed economic consumption by irrational men. Sexologists navigated between 
addressing the natural order of perverse sexualities, while offering some promise of 
rehabilitation based on accounts of neoclassical economic subjectivity. This is the 
sexological prescription we maintain as sexuality. 
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Krafft-Ebing‟s (1965 [1894]) composite of sexual desire proposed a potentially 
dangerous quantity of desire, which no less than all of civilization must work to contain. 
Subsequently, what sexological discourse offered the sexual deviant were theoretical 
prescriptions and cures only through other fulfilled desires, or the slight possibility that 
cravings would eventually erode, or hopefully get explained by a future theory of natural 
bodily defects (Dean 1996:20). So, once the deviant was ensnared either by police, the 
concerned husband, the psychologist, the reformer, or the moral vice squad, there was no 
way out of the sexological system of sexuality.  
Bloch‟s (1936[1909]) other opus Sexual Life of Our Time: In Its Relations to 
Modern Civilization also sets out on the bourgeois adventure of making universal and 
natural meaning out of cases of sexual perversions. He offered neoclassical economic 
therapy as bodily cure. Bloch valiantly attempted, through twisted logic, to salvage 
masturbation as natural until it was morbidly expressed by “individuals who are 
previously morbid” (1936:411). Similar to sexology‟s general inability to “locate the 
sexual definitively in the body” (Dean 1996:21), Bloch struggled to make the case that 
sexual perversions, gender differences, prostitution, and enjoyment of pornography are 
definitive bodily disorders. He instead employed sexuality as an obvious backdrop and 
self-evident justification for these moral perversions. In any case, his estimation of 
himself and his class is evident in the following warning about pornography and erotica: 
These obscene writings may be compared with natural poisons, which also must 
be carefully studied, but which can be entrusted only to those who are fully 
acquainted with their dangerous effects, who know how to control and counteract 
these effects, and who regard them as an object of natural research by means of 
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which they will be enabled to obtain an understanding of other phenomena. 
[Bloch 1936:734] 
 
The right men with the right mind do not need to protect themselves, they just need to 
know they can. 
In this chapter, I explained how sexological discourse constructed sexuality in 
parallel to economic philosophy. Like neoclassical economic philosophy, sexologists 
appealed to a theory of desire that mirrored economic man and employed similar ideals, 
like a marginal utility of desire and consumption. Sexologists composed human sexual 
subjectivity as distinctly rational, male, self-centered, and upper-class. Sexuality also 
served to increase the construction and categorization of perversions. Sexologists also 
elaborated theories of sexuality that aimed to explain and possibly rehabilitate deviants it 
perceived in the newly modernized world. An outlet for normal desire must be found, 
hopefully in the (normal) coitus of heterosexual expression, but the outlook is never 
good. Perhaps in frustration, sexologists‟  “concern with deviance grew more obsessive” 
(Dean 1996:8) and necessitated a psychological explanation: 
This shift in focus away from sexual practices to the psychology of perversions 
was consistent with a general transfer of interest from the consequences of acts to 
their causes, from the description of behavior to a preoccupation with the 
impulses that drive it. [Dean 1996:19] 
 
Sexological theory paralleled and always depended on neoclassical notions of economic 
man and his supposed desires; there is a necessity in realizing sexual pleasure, but only in 
a rational, male, economizing way. I argue that sexologists retained this human economic 
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subjectivity by placing rational, self-interested, upper-class male consumers at the center 
of a supposedly universal human sexual subjectivity. They named this sexuality. 
 Finally, I attempted to demonstrate that class-based anxieties and class struggle 
motivated sexological research and facilitated the construction and idealization of 
sexuality. In another case of frustrated utility, late-19
th
 century and early-20
th
 century 
sexologists are never able to contain or rehabilitate what they document (either through 
documentation, or later, therapeutic psychology). Sexologists attempt, and fail, to render 
deviant bodies and desires theoretically stable, ahistorical, and universal as much as 
economists failed to capture all the material realities and account for the fluctuations in 
the political economy. Yet, sexology magnificently succeeded in establishing and 
concretizing an immaterial and supposedly non-economic ideal of sexuality as a natural 
expression of all humanity.  
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Chapter 3: Queering Anthropology 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine how cultural anthropologists and queer theorists contest 
sexual identity, sexual orientation, and sexuality as a universal, natural, and non-material 
frame for understanding bodies, pleasure, affection, and agency. I will demonstrate, 
however, that sexuality remains a problematic analytical category for queer 
anthropological research. The use of sexuality to address, explain, or frame knowledge is 
limiting and certainly, as I will show in this chapter, unnecessary.  
As I noted in the Introduction, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) 
exhort social and cultural scholars to pay close attention to distinctions between 
“categories of practice” and “categories of analysis.” Social actors and social 
organizations use categories of practice to make sense of everyday situations and create 
cohesive meaning and understanding in social relations. This does not necessitate use of 
the same categories for social analysis (2000:5-6). The distinction between categories is 
instrumental in helping me understand why cultural theorists and queer anthropologists 
need to employ sexuality to engage with their informants through categories of practice. 
For instance, research informants will use the category of sexuality (and sexual identities 
like gay, lesbian, straight, and other locally related terms) to explain and describe their 
beliefs and experiences (Bérubé 1990; Boellstorff 2005; Lewin 1993; Newton 1979; 
Weston 1991), and researchers will use these accounts to develop histories and 
ethnographies of cultural practice (Cameron and Kulick 2003; Escoffier 1998; Duberman 
et al 1989; Faderman 1991; Gallo 2006; Herdt 1992; Johnson 2004; Katz 1976; Newton 
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1993). Following Brubaker and Cooper (2000), this does not necessitate the use of 
sexuality as a category of analysis. In establishing sexuality as neoclassical economic 
philosophy of the body, I hope this further stresses the need to reconsider the continual 
deployment of sexuality in queer anthropological work. I believe my argument can and 
should problematize the use among other disciplinary analyses of sexuality (Carver and 
Mottier 1998; Jónasdóttier et al 2011; Kimmel and Plante 2004; Oleksy 2009; Sinfield 
2004; Williams 2006). I find the continual use of sexuality to be especially troubling, 
though, within the union of anthropological and queer theory.  
I refer to the union of anthropological and queer theory as “queer anthropology.” 
This union is considered relatively recent in academic institutions, but as Gayle Rubin 
notes this is more a product of amnesia about “Queer Studies‟s past [sic]” than a new 
disciplinary crossing (2011:354-355). A foreshadow of an explicitly queer theory in 
cultural anthropology is not widely acknowledged until Kath Weston‟s (1993) article 
“Lesbian/Gay Studies in the House of Anthropology.” This is followed more than a 
decade later by Tom Boellstorff‟s (2007b) “Queer Studies in the House of 
Anthropology.” In this chapter, I will accentuate how both social and cultural 
anthropologists and queer theorists confronted similar, significant intellectual dilemmas 
prior to the official recognition of queer anthropology (at least by academic theorists and 
academic institutions). I then briefly review three criticisms of cultural anthropological 
knowledge and then introduce materialist criticism of queer theory. I compare how 
cultural anthropologists and queer theorists attempt to account for human subjectivity 
within social constructions (like “sexuality”) and still make sense of human social 
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agency, resistance to domination of life-ways filled with affective alliances and bodily 
pleasures.  
Simply, how are human sexual subjects understood as cultural compositions and 
also as vibrant confirmations of social savvy and social resistance? This is no simple task; 
I attend to this dilemma and am prompted to employ “new” theories of queer 
anthropological sexual subjectivity for this work. This dilemma is explicit in queer 
theory: how can we study social construction and simultaneously assess social and 
political agency (Jagose 1996; Wilchins 2004)? Queer theories propose self-conscious 
attempts to change thinking about social life and encourage resistance to forms of sexual 
and gender injustice. I address this pursuit of a holistic sexual subjectivity mapped above 
social and historical specificity as a fertile “queer dilemma.” 
I celebrate the achievements of queer anthropology (so far) but remain deeply 
troubled by an overall reliance on sexuality to frame both ends of this dilemma. Queer 
anthropologists assemble theories carefully, and even lovingly, in an attempt to 
understand pleasure and agency in material, political, and lived ways. The effort 
considers ways to also comprehend, then contest, the discourses of Western sexuality as 
necessarily universal and meaningful for all humans everywhere—at all times. In doing 
so, queer theorists and cultural anthropologists attempt to contest the supposed 
psychological, universal sexual subject. In short, how do humans embody culture and 
also generate cultural change? There is a call for “queer ethic” in sexual cultural study 
that can also compose a practical ground for queer theoretical knowledge (Warner 1999, 
2012; Crosby, Duggan, and Ferguson et al 2012; Tapley 2012). I believe cultural 
ethnography can answer this call if it attends more closely to it analytical assumptions 
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when deploying sexuality. In this way, I hope to expand on what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
offered when thinking—queerly—of other theoretical possibilities for social and cultural 
research and political economic criticism:  
That‟s one of the things that “queer” can refer to: the open mesh of possibilities, 
gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when 
the constituent elements of anyone‟s gender, of anyone‟s sexuality aren‟t made 
(or can‟t be made) to signify monolithically. The experimental linguistic, 
epistemological, representational, political adventures attaching to the very many 
of us who may at times be moved to describe ourselves as (among many other 
possibilities) pushy femmes, radical faeries, fantasists, drags, clones, leatherfolk, 
ladies in tuxedos, feminist women or feminist men, masturbators, bulldaggers, 
divas, Snap! queens, butch bottoms, storytellers, transsexuals, aunties, wannabes, 
lesbian-identified men or lesbians who sleep with men, or…people able to relish, 
learn from, or identify with such. [Sedgwick 1993:8] 
 
This queer mesh of possibility supports experimental and counterintuitive ways of 
thinking about human sexual subjectivity. This offers a creatively porous backdrop from 
which to criticize and think about sexuality. 
Lastly, in this chapter, I examine recent developments in queer anthropology. I 
argue that despite brilliant contestations of sexuality, explicit maintenance of sexuality as 
a category of analysis constrains anthropological and queer holistic visions of sex as 
material and agentive (and culturally and locally specific). A more complete 
deconstruction of sexuality is necessary even here—a critical analysis that should 
emphasize sexuality as a limiting framework for interpreting and explaining material 
bodies and pleasures. This limitation hinders more radical political thinking about 
pleasure, agency, and material life.  
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I then note a final queer dilemma: does dismissing neoclassical-inspired human 
rationality produce an insurmountable obstacle to theorizing human pleasure-oriented 
subjectivity? Namely, does criticizing a rational economic human subjectivity block 
possibilities for theorizing sexual subjectivity as social agency? If we hope to address 
human subjects as rational, material, sexual subjects are we limited in our effort, from the 
start, by an over-reliance on criticisms of economic rationality? I explore this final queer 
dilemma, before addressing Out in Theory: The Emergence of Gay and Lesbian 
Anthropology (Leap and Lewin 2002) and concluding this thesis.  
 
Anthropological Queerness 
The subject of anthropology is the human, and the human is a cultural being. The 
anthropological human subject embodies both culture and cultural change. Determining 
what “culture” is, does, and can be ultimately traces dense and arguable boundaries 
between empirical science, history, and political theory. Anthropological culture is 
conceived as human social behavior: a complex whole of belief and practice. Kate 
Crehan assesses that cultures “are in some sense patterned wholes… fundamental to the 
anthropological notion of culture as a „way of life‟, however that may have been 
understood” (2002:42). Culture is understood in diverse ways. Raymond Williams (1976) 
noted culture as a most beguiling term in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society. Despite this range, anthropological culture is generally understood as patterned 
systems of meaning, neither entirely bound nor entirely subsumed within larger power 
contexts (Crehan 2002:42-45). In this milieu, cultural anthropological concern is 
knowledge of the cultural “Other.” Yet, as cultural anthropologists manage this complex 
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whole, they too have moved to more applicable terms like identity and discourse 
(Foucault 1978), and habitus and doxa (Bourdieu 1977). 
The cultural anthropologist assesses human subjectivity within culture and then 
attempts to portrait a specified cultural subjectivity within an understanding that all 
human subjectivity is cultural. The cultural anthropological project manifests by 
considering the human subject as part of culture, but who also lives and acts as a 
knowledgeable cultural agent. The anthropologist must, therefore, also rely on subjective 
common sense, reflective accounts, and memories of the cultural subject‟s own telling. In 
turn, ethnographic data is gathered and interpreted by the cultural anthropologist. 
Ethnographic knowledge endures then as inter-subjective accounts of humans in culture 
and human culture more broadly.  Knowledge is constructed subjectively through the 
anthropologist‟s own cultural beliefs. Though this perspective may not circulate among 
today‟s cultural anthropologists in the same ways, it still deeply resonates with the queer 
dilemmas I propose in this thesis. Historian George Stocking (1989) proposes this 
anthropological longing for culture as a desire to capture what it means to be a cultural 
human being, and a longing to somehow limit one‟s personal peculiarities and passions 
when interpreting „Other‟ cultures. This is a generous and noble interpretation of cultural 
knowledge makers as human ambassadors to other humans for other humans. Though 
some may criticize this vision as politically naïve, I am still inspired by this historical 
interpretation of desire and longing for a wider cultural understanding.  
The quality of anthropology‟s effort and its status as a human and social science 
are not immune to broad critiques and anxieties. I now address three major criticisms of 
social and cultural anthropology. I roughly sketch this in historical order but ultimately 
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recognize these criticisms neither begin, nor end, within the intellectual work of social 
and cultural anthropology. I offer these criticisms because I find useful parallels to the 
queer theoretical project. I begin with the assessment of the “problem of culture.” Next, I 
briefly address the historical traditions of race, primitivism, and human difference within 
social and cultural anthropology. Finally, I examine postcolonial and postmodern 
criticism as aimed at anthropological knowledge and anthropologists. I suggest these 
criticisms create a fertile ground where queer anthropology blooms in the intellectual 
aftermath.  
As Michael Elliot explains in The Culture Concept: Writing and Difference in the 
Age of Realism (2002), the problem in the beginning of anthropology was “to portray 
culture as a coherent object without ignoring the possibility of cultural change, and to 
appreciate the complexity and power of culture while still accounting for the fate of the 
individual at odds with it” (177-178). At the turn of the American and European 20th 
century the concept of cultures made two other irreconcilable fears logical: the fear of 
homogenization by the “leveling forces” of technological modernity, and a fear of 
miscegenation and other racialized collusion (Elliott 2002: xv). The historical concept of 
cultures was also a means of alleviating social anxieties through the systematic reduction 
of “other” culture into something fully separate in both space and time—an effort to 
produce subjectivities of difference divisible by geographic space and evolutionary time. 
This type of cultural analysis produced so-called primitive cultures and peoples. This 
sentiment seems to still hold sway in contemporary thinking on anthropology. I think of 
the recent addition of the Anthropologie store in gentrified spaces. It is a high-priced 
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trinket, household goods, and clothing store that appeals to a notion of arts and crafts 
produced by fleshless and spaceless global “cultures.” 
My peers often commented on their slight embarrassment in revealing their 
anthropological studies to other students because notions of “primitive people” in 
contemporary times still circulate. It was also due to few peers grasping what 
anthropologists study (apes? sex? “Indians”? bones?). This reticence also functioned to 
avoid titillating and short-sighted comments anthropology sometimes inspired in others. 
Anthropology‟s diverse scope across four general sub-fields of knowledge (social and 
cultural anthropology, archaeology, linguistic anthropology, and biological anthropology) 
certainly inspires cross-disciplinary confusion.  
My peers and I would laugh when we assessed the diverse texts we would tote, 
from evolutionary studies on human ancestry to ethnographies of romance and kinship. 
Our humor aside, this reveals our own confusion over how to embrace a proper 
disciplinary history in a climate of political suspicion about cultural difference. Yet we 
also understood through our studies that now taken for granted assumptions of cultural 
subjectivity, cultural relativism, and beliefs all humanity‟s equivalence is also rooted in 
this disciplinary history. As Regina Darnell points out, notions of human equality were 
not always granted the almost unconscious status in Western political life as they are 
today (2001:12-28). Of course, these sentiments are not shared by everyone. Primarily, 
though, cultural anthropology is criticized for its role in the historical shaping of non-
Western “primitivism”. Despite the historical condition of this charge, anthropologists 
still deal with similar short-sighted criticism. Regina Darnell and Stephen O. Murray 
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(2001) argue that grappling with these invisible genealogies should continually invigorate 
our research. They state: 
Much in our disciplinary past does not meet present-day standards of ethics, 
indeed, is ethnocentric at best. But while other social scientists continue to 
emphasize the gap between civilized and so-called primitive—a perspective 
deeply embedded in Western civilization—anthropologists have been listening to 
cultural others and trying to engage in dialogue. There are lessons in the failures 
as well as in the successes. [Darnell 2001: xiii] 
 
Failures and successes need not remain invisible, each are worthy of historical and 
contemporary discernment. And the effort to actually engage with real, material human 
beings I consider a necessary endeavor, perhaps even more necessary in our time. 
 Recent efforts in queer theory similarly attempt to celebrate the accidents, failure, 
and missed connections in cultural life—to seek out invisible genealogies that others shy 
away from in embarrassment, in shame, and with melancholy political apologies 
(Halberstam 2011). Yes, anthropological understanding coordinates a complicated set of 
contemporary politics, historical embarrassments, and cultural misunderstandings. The 
anthropological tradition and its methods remain, however, a unique project precisely 
because it risks confronting the object of inquiry—cultural subjects are worth knowing, 
“people are not dupes but experts, analysts, even theoreticians” (Darnell 2001:7). This 
effort is valuable because it attempts to synchronize ideas about power/knowledge, 
complex sets of cultural crossings, and always pungent political choices.  
There is another shared anthropological and queer dilemma about human 
subjectivity: what does it mean to be different? What does it mean to be different across 
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borders and within liminal spaces? Postcolonial criticism launched in the 1970‟s to the 
1990‟s implicated anthropological traditions within colonial practices of domination, and 
contested idealizations of cultural difference (Huggan 2001; Said 1978). Postcolonial 
theorizing criticized the concept of culture, and it attempted to illuminate the complexity 
embedded within the meaning of nation, Empire, and the citizen. This criticism also 
reminded scholars that knowledge makers should be held accountable for the fates of 
those being studied (Argyrou 2002). This criticism revealed how material life was always 
battered by the flows of colonialism and postcolonial globalization. There are no cultural 
islands in postcolonial theory; cultural subjectivity is political subjectivity. This idea is 
also intensely cultivated in queer theories—there are no non-queer islands of apolitical 
sexual subjectivity. But does this mean researchers will always locate politicized sexual 
identities everywhere? 
Postcolonial theorist Chandra Mohanty (1995) criticized liberal, Western 
feminism for reproducing colonial relations of gender and sex within global feminism 
and empowerment programs. Western feminisms may work under the banner of 
liberation but don metaphorical masks of culturally universal womanhood—an 
assemblage of Western political detail, accented with ethnographic detail for intellectual 
concealment. With this postcolonial perspective in mind, social and cultural theorists 
should be measured as knowledge gatherers and fact-makers on race, native peoples, 
Westward expansion, and often in service of Imperial and colonizing efforts (Patterson 
2001:3; Biolsi and Zimmerman 1997). Postcolonial critique should still help serve as a 
warning when social and cultural theorists are now expected to cultivate knowledge and 
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comment on the diversity of global “sexuality.” The demand for a universal sexuality is a 
perilous queer dilemma. 
Similar to Mohanty‟s criticism of a recognizable, straightforward, universal 
womanhood, we now seem to expect a universal sexuality waiting to be freed. There is 
now a demand for an intelligible, universal sexuality. This demand is especially prevalent 
in ideals of a “gay” subjectivity waiting to be freed throughout the world. Documentary 
films like Dangerous Living: Coming Out in the Developing World (Scagliotti 2005) and 
the PBS broadcast Frontline: The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan (Doran 2010) offer ample 
evidence of this effort. Both films express a passion for sexual freedom and autonomy, 
yet neither documentary adequately addresses local and material contingencies that 
profoundly complicate Western efforts to raise a banner for universalized sexual freedom. 
For example, in Dangerous the “developing world” is never addressed as a postcolonial 
effect. Local forms of sex, pleasure, and affection are not connected in any meaningful 
way to global politics except to assert that “coming out” as gay is dangerous in Egypt and 
Iran, and viewers should unquestionably condemn regimes that condemn 
“homosexuality.” Certainly pleasure, affective alliances, and real lives are at stake in this 
documentary, and it is indeed alarming to watch anyone rounded up and chained, for any 
reason. But this documentation is also clear evidence of a tendency to universalize 
sexuality as sexual identity and un-problematically equate this to political, democratic 
freedom that is only enjoyed in the homeland of the filmmakers.  
Jasbir Puar (2010) warns of the tendency to assert Western sexual freedom as 
rhetorical evidence for global political and military incursions. She condemns the 
neoliberal equation asserting American and Western tolerance of “homosexuality” as 
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evidence of democratic equality. She names this a “homonationalism” that works to 
codify anti-Muslim extremism, racism, and ethnocentrism within ideals of sexual 
freedom. As I consider the actual political ambivalence and resistance to sexual 
differences in Western nations (Rubin 1984), I understand this with some irony.  
In Dancing Boys, documentarians propose themselves as offering anthropological 
insight into local traditions of dancing boys. The rituals and performances of the dancing 
boys (some adolescents, but mostly teenagers) are scrutinized by the filmmakers and 
condemned as practices of sexual predation. The dancing boys are often “purchased” 
through family networks, or traded, and perform stylized dances for rural men‟s 
associations. It seems that some of the boys are highly valued, some are physically 
harmed, and some engage in sexual exchanges with certain men. There are a number of 
ways to criticize cultural practices in various locales, and one should never discount the 
need for political intervention in practices of abuse and torture. But my criticism asks 
how this long-standing tradition (the filmmaker makes this point) is presented as obvious 
evidence for Western intervention in “tribal” areas of Afghanistan. The film‟s narrator  
admits that a dancing boy is an “ancient” tribal practice yet “secretly revived.” 
Apparently if it was ancient, but never ceased, it would be less of a concern. Either way, 
the history, anthropology, and variable details of this tradition are not presented, but the 
need for sexual “modernity” is ostensibly a rationale for military and political 
intervention of some kind.  
The third criticism of anthropological knowledge is postmodern. Postmodernist 
stances are used to critique the ideal of an apolitical, knowable, and universal human 
subject (Connor 1997; Lyotard 1984; Rabinow 2003). Postmodernism intentionally 
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ruptured the possibility of an apolitical cultural reality. In other words, how do we assess 
whole human subject in the first place? What potential knowledge is eliminated by ideals 
of normalcy? Accordingly, erecting “legitimate” knowledge is always at the expense of 
other ways of knowing. Effort should be made to determine what systematization buries, 
not what it supposedly reveals (Rabinow 1985). Yet we humans must live and cooperate 
within some set consistencies; human culture is defined by this fact. How do we preserve 
values of equality within this contested theoretical postmodern terrain? This positions and 
substantiates some queer theorizing as well. The system of sexuality can be thus 
examined, queerly, for what it disguises in the service of a coherent systemization for the 
body and its pleasures—called sexuality. Yet how do we move from one set of cultural 
coordinates (and cultural places) to another and still preserve any idea of equality and 
nondiscrimination that may have been courageously carved from a sex/gender system of 
sexuality? 
With these previous examples I illustrate how historical, postcolonial, and 
postmodern contentions cut ragged paths within academic disciplines, and distinctly alter 
cultural research. I hope reviewing these criticisms foregrounds a key (and queer) 
question: Whose thinking is privileged in the politically and materially loaded circulation 
of meaning? Simply, this reminds me of what children hurl back when called upon to 
change their behavior or perform some tedious task: Who says? With these serious 
criticisms one could assume cultural anthropological theorizing would collapse under the 
weight of the charges (certainly some wish this), but it changed, adapted, and I argue 
improved. Many of these indictments aimed beyond anthropology to Western philosophy, 
and epistemology more generally in the first place. The absorption of these criticisms, 
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though, sets a particularly appropriate stage for queer theorists‟ direct, politicized, and 
critical work in destabilizing normative knowledge about sex and sexuality within 
cultural theory. Perhaps it is no surprise then that queer anthropology has formed such a 
productive embrace in the last decade (Boellstorff 2007b; Bousiou 2008; Gopinath 2005; 
Gray 2009). 
 
Thinking Queer Anthropologically 
The Queer Nation Manifesto, distributed during a 1991 protest in Washington 
D.C., partly states:  
 
It‟s not about the mainstream, profit-margins, patriotism, patriarchy or being 
assimilated. It‟s not about executive directors, privilege and elitism. It‟s about 
being on the margins, defining ourselves; it‟s about gender-fuck and secrets, 
what‟s beneath the belt and deep inside the heart; it‟s about the night. Being queer 
is “grass roots” because we know that everyone of us, every body, every cunt, 
every heart and ass and dick is a world of pleasure waiting to be explored. Every 
one of us is a world of infinite possibility. We must fight for ourselves (no else is 
going to do it) and if in that process we bring greater freedom to the world at large 
then great. 
 
The intersection of queer and anthropology may surprise some scholars and activists; 
what with anthropology‟s emphasis on extant culture and queer theory‟s initial focus on 
textual criticism aimed at Western society‟s heteronormative (the assumption that 
heterosexuality is always natural and normal) and homophobic social institutions. I hope 
by reviewing the aforementioned criticisms the crossing of anthropology and queer 
theory is clearer.  
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Queer theorizing proposes intentional, politicized ways to disrupt binary thinking 
about the sexed body, gender, and especially sexuality (Jagose 1996; Wilchins 2004; 
Warner 1999). Queer theory crucially re-imagines subjectivity and the categories of sex, 
pleasure, and agency in relation to sexuality (Turner 2000:106-138; Butler 1990; 
Sedgwick 1990). Heteronormative assumptions continually assert heterosexuality as 
natural, essential, biological, and normal for all people, everywhere. Heteronormativity is 
critiqued by queer theorists as male-centered, genital centered (the act of “penetration”), 
and intentionally ignorant of political and material economies of sexual culture. 
Heteronormativity undergirds and constructs much of contemporary and conventional 
thinking about sex, identity, and desire; this presupposed logic commands allegiance in 
deep and wide-ranging ways (Jagose 1996; Wilchins 2004).  
Queer theorists attempt to critique “normal” heterosexuality because it remains 
the touchstone for the majority of contemporary social institutions (family, education, 
politics, religion, government, among many others). Queering heteronormative life 
proposes self-consciously transgressive confrontations with the normative rules and 
expectations of sexuality (Turner 2000:1-35; Sullivan 2003:37-56). Queer theorists attack 
the coherency of identity, and they condemn registers of sexual identity as absolutely 
necessary in contemporary social life. Queer theorists are more interested in what people 
“really do” and, critically, what they do in resistance to domination and injustice. 
Queer theorizing then proposes necessary political and social breaches (Jagose 
1996; Wilchins 2004; Warner 1999; Sullivan 2003) in the damming and containing of 
gender, sex, sexuality, and even love (Kipnis 2003). Through close inspection artificial 
reservoirs of assumed natural orders can be disrupted. Ideally, sexuality is disrupted as an 
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apparent, universal category of meaning and a binary notion of sexuality, understood as 
heterosexuality or homosexuality, is rejected (Foucault 1978; Halperin 1990). Queering, 
perhaps of all sexual theorization, recognizes how sexuality operates as a discursive 
regime in contemporary Western culture. It takes Foucault‟s work on sexuality as central 
to its project (Spargo 1999). In other words, queer theorists assert that sexuality is the 
way we, as cultural and sexual subjects, are allowed to understand sexual knowledge 
about ourselves, about others, and about what human bodies potentially can be. Queer 
theory violates paradigmatic thought on sexuality‟s supposed essential humanness. 
Despite all of the contemporary research on “sexuality,” an ideal of essentialist 
thinking on sexuality still remains hegemonic in Western culture (Vance 2005:15-32). 
Sexuality is now an important topic of research in the majority of academic disciplines. It 
is called trendy, celebratory, justified, and necessary; it captivates contemporary social 
theorists and social scientists. Thus in name and in study (even when contested) sexuality 
remains the premier way for thinking about pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social 
agency. It is a supposed bodily container that holds multiple, contrasting ideations of the 
body and its pleasures, but still manages to contain them all. Sexuality circulates in 
pragmatic, every day, sophisticated, and politicized ways. To queer theorize is to begin 
with the assumption that sexuality is a historical and not altogether pleasant frame for 
understanding bodies and pleasure. It is assumed to be for our bodies—for all bodies, in 
all places, and all times. In its monolithic place, queer theory offers instead theories of 
fluid desires, contingent pleasures, and overlapping affections and intimacies.  
In summary, queer theorizing rejects a stable, natural essence to sexuality as 
bodily pleasure and affection. It also equally rejects positing that “truth will allow us to 
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recognize without shame the meaning of our desire” (Mansfield 2000:105). Queering 
aims to tear apart, to render unstable, to expose bias, to offer critical questions, but no set 
answers, to upset, to delegitimize, and to “camp up” (Newton 1979) heteronormative  
knowledge and all its institutions. Queer theorists like Riki Wilchins, Michael Warner, 
Kate Bornstein, Jonathan Ned Katz, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Jeffrey Weeks criticize 
assimilation and instead value radical political interrogation and action (Jagose 1996; 
Weeks 1995; Sullivan 2003). 
Though queer theorists‟ political practices may not neatly align, questions about 
the value of assimilation remain a central node in queer criticism. In this way, queering 
celebrates the individualized and radical potential for altering social meaning. This 
dovetails with the anthropological need to account for social agency, resistance, and 
cultural change. To queer is to realize both the realities and possibilities that attend to 
fluid expressions of pleasure, affection, and intimacy. I argue this composition of human 
sexual subjectivity remains cultural, but queer theorists also stridently value the wielding 
of cultural practices in socially disruptive ways. Queer anthropologists then must invest 
human subjectivity with abilities that counter hegemonic order in clever, social, and 
personal ways. The queer anthropological subject is composed as simultaneously valuing 
disrupting approved sexual and bodily behavior, and granting pleasure to behaviors 
deemed illegitimately sexual.  
Despite this ambitious focus on agency, queer theorists are routinely criticized for 
feeble work on material and pragmatic daily existences where agency actually takes 
shape in everyday and sometimes not so fantastical ways (Hennessy 1996, 2000; Morton 
1996:1-33). Queer theorists are criticized for avoiding key material determinants like 
81 
 
class, race, reproduction, and other aspects of life. Rosemary Hennessy outlines how 
identity political agendas, whether queer or not, set out to legitimize oppressed social 
groups while “leaving the organization of social life in fundamental ways unquestioned” 
(1996:215). This is evident in an anemic, if not wholly absent, critique of late-industrial 
capitalism. Critics argue that instead of offering economic solidarity across classes, queer 
theories actually do little to disrupt hegemonic culture and merely enable illusions of 
critique by lauding “porous, gender-flexible and playful subjects, subject more adequate 
to the multinational commodity exchange” and this is “embarrassingly inadequate” 
(1996:232).  
I ask: Does queer theory merely replicate the normative customs it hopes to 
upend, queer, and make strange? Dana Cloud certainly assesses queer theory in such a 
way: 
In spite of its manifest opposition to normalizing familial discourses, [queer] 
replicates this logic…Further, queer theory, like family values rhetoric, discredits 
collective political responses to social problems in favor of ludic textualist 
strategies. It poses utopian experiments in intimate fulfillment—akin to the 1950s 
suburban family ideal—in lieu of a collective, political struggle. [Cloud 2002:72] 
 
In this estimation queer theory ineffectually theorizes intimate, sexual spheres as sites of 
resistance and emancipation. In other words, queer theorists simply imagine our 
affectionate alliances and pleasurable capacities hold all the seeds for social 
transformation and economic equity. For critics like Cloud and Hennessy, structural 
economic problems are cast onto so-called personal lives as personal problems 
(something neoliberalism already does); queer theory may simply sustain inequitable 
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economic structures. Is effective political attention deflected away from politics when 
theorists are mostly concerned with self-inventions of identity, and imagined arenas of 
private life? I propose that queer anthropology offers a tonic to such sexual and material 
concerns directed at more theoretical queer studies. Queer anthropologists Tom 
Boellstorff, Martin Manalansan, David Valentine, and Kath Weston must manage both 
queer theoretical ambitions and anthropologically grounded realities of human cultural 
subjectivity. 
Sexuality does remain an evocative theory of individuated personhood, 
heteronormativity, and masculine economic rationality despite queer efforts to historicize 
and destabilize these embedded meanings. Yet, our queer anthropological efforts can also 
aim through sexuality to disrupt what Hennessy argues is “capitalism‟s increasing 
colonization of the body and sensation” (Hennessy 2006:388). She further notes how 
“Affective needs that are organized into what gets called „sexuality‟ are only one aspect 
of much broader affective and sensate relations that feature in everyday life” (2006:389). 
This is a vital point and queer anthropology may offer this queering of structure and of 
everyday life—but I argue this potential is corroded when employing and relying on 
sexuality to describe and explain pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency.  
 
Sex, Sexuality, and Economic Development Programs 
 I use critical discourse analysis to challenge the paradigmatic status of sexuality 
for framing and discussing pleasure, affection, intimacy and social agency throughout 
this thesis. The ideal of a coherent and universal sexuality simultaneously maintains 
understanding of other bodily domains like health, reproduction, gender, as well as other 
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embedded meanings of sexual identity, sexual politics, and familial life. A queer dilemma 
is thus invoked in economic development programs that focus on sex and sexuality: how 
is sexuality in these cases an assumed a priori universal category, yet also a domain for 
self-inspection and active social interrogation, and also a discursive site for economic 
promises of development?  In other words, how is sexuality assumed to be something one 
is “born with” but also a site for understanding human subjects as dynamic, affectionate, 
and active social agents within economic development ideologies?  
 Adams and Pigg ask in their anthropological critique of economic development, 
Sex in Development: Science, Sexuality, and Morality in Global Perspective, “how the 
proliferation of modes of speaking and writing about sexuality were and are imbricated in 
managing complex differentials of power and in effecting dispersed means of social 
control, particularly through forms of self-revelation and monitoring” (2005:5). 
Accordingly, a key dilemma for queer anthropological study is how we can assess sexual 
cultures and cultural differences while managing the Western ideology of sexuality as the 
transit point of intelligible knowledge and meaning about sexual behavior. All the while 
researchers must remain nimble and imaginative enough to account for the cultural 
specificity of sexual cultures and resulting sexual subjectivities.  
 How then can we discuss sexuality—without sexuality? This is a profoundly 
important question to ask about economic development ideologies that promise economic 
incentives and benefits for participating. This is a very queer dilemma, indeed, when 
local informants also must manage the local ideals of pleasure and affection, in contrast 
to local, national, or global forms wedded in economic development programs. In 
economic development the category of practice bumps headfirst into the category of 
84 
 
analysis. In other words, the first question for queer anthropology is how to name sex, 
pleasure, and affection, if not sexuality? What if the subjects of study do understand and 
negotiate the category of sexuality as well? Simply, what if human beings note that they 
“do have one?” Then, if we study local sexual practices do we simultaneously flatten 
local custom and knowledge while rendering sexuality as the rightful place holder for 
intelligible knowledge about the body‟s pleasures and affections? Then how can we 
assess this traction when all the choices are composed in the context of real economic 
need and the promise of economic development? These questions foreground the call for 
a queerer anthropological understanding of sexual behavior, pleasure, and agency—by 
limiting sexuality and offering something meaningful and imaginative in its place. This 
all then must be translated for an audience. This is not a simple task.  
Adams and Pigg (2005) pay close attention to how economic development models 
increasingly favor standards of sex and fertility, and recently offer attention to the ideal 
of identity-based, universalized sexualities. Sexuality, as a category of assumed 
personhood and personal understanding, supports notions of economic development in 
several ways. It is useful to remember that “a more nuanced and historicized 
understanding begins from the… proposition that a world economy is a bounded social 
totality which may or may not be world-wide in scope. Here, globalization refers to the 
reach of particular social practices throughout an extant world economy” (Germain 
2000:73). This particular ideal of sexuality functioning only as a Western invention of 
control may ignore how systems of social production always were and continually are 
interconnected throughout global economies.  
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Ann Stoler explores (1995) such colonial interactions with Western categorical 
inventions of sex and body. She argues that sexual and gendered categories are mapped 
primarily through colonial interactions and imperial anxieties. Sexuality, in this view, 
was already composed within the intimate associations of colonialism, race, and the 
development of education and psychology. While the factory system and industrialization 
develops in Europe and, later, in the United States, the colonial process is already well 
underway. The development of education models, psychological discourse and, essential 
to my study, economical sexology is inculcated and constructed with this colonial 
knowledge. A system of sexual disenfranchisement, ordering of slave and underpaid 
labor, and social anxieties about the family and women are all transformations that cannot 
be understood without attending to colonialism and colonial history (Stoler 1995, 2002; 
Minitz 1985). This history resonates in economic development programs that attend to 
sex, sexuality, and sexual rights in contemporary societies. This still applies then to 
globalization and neoliberal development ideologies today.  
Attention to women‟s bodies, sex, and sexual rights encompass a large area of 
governmental and non-governmental economic development programming, as well as 
more recent programming under the banner of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender 
(GLBT) activism and equal rights. Both label their aid within a rubric of personal and 
political freedom, both deploy conceptions of coherent sexualities, and both profess a 
self-evident need to be freed (in these cases, both economically and politically). As 
Foucault clarified, however, even when using the supposedly neutral category of “sex” 
this presupposes and imagines a world of specific, universally intelligible sexual behavior 
as sex acts—as  “sex” and thus as sexuality (1978:155-157). 
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The International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group endeavors to 
present the perspectives and experiences of women throughout the world and engage in 
localized political action. I admire their work and attention to many of the dilemmas I 
detail in this thesis. The researchers make explicit a reliance on the women‟s own words 
(Petchesky and Judd et al 1998). The group declares that without “voices” of women 
commenting on local cultural context research into reproduction, gender, labor, and 
sexuality will remain embedded in problematic assumptions of an assumed universal 
applicability. I find this point important and necessary for my study. Their research 
shares a commitment to the broad category of feminist intervention in public policy, 
while noting that what constitutes human rights is contentious in local, cultural, and 
national contexts. 
Rosalind Petchesky outlines (1998:19-20) how what gets counted as local and 
useful political intervention may still be encumbered though with issues and errors of 
translation, a reduction of local experiences to fit Western categorical frameworks of sex, 
and a misuse of cultural knowledge. Collaboration with locals is always more desirable 
though than not. Her research attempts to expand on several cross-cultural themes: 
reproduction (encompassing both biological and social reproduction throughout the life 
cycle); rights and entitlement (human “integrity” mixed with local understanding of 
oppressive local conditions); “body and self;” and “accommodation and resistance.” All 
theorists in the group are committed to “positive action” and “empowering changes in the 
lives of those who are both its subjects and agents” (Petchesky and Judd 1998:20). These 
concepts, while providing grounding, remain highly contested within the working 
research group. 
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Importantly, Petchesky recognizes sexuality as a separate category that includes 
pleasure, desire, and sex and not reducible to reproduction and the birthing of children. In 
doing so the group recognizes that sex and sexuality should be understood distinctly from 
reproduction and fertility. But is that the way sex and sexuality is experienced on the 
ground? Petchesky notes that intellectuals and activists in the group confront 
unpredictable results when accounting for local agents who may not agree, nor support 
the programs and politics of development (even in the name of sexual freedom) 
(1998:20). In other words, local agents may not always subscribe to the agendas, 
language, or perspective of those who want to speak politically on their behalf in the 
name of development, queer interventions, or anthropological knowledge. The credibility 
of sexuality as a category of analysis is severely strained in this context. Petchesky 
admirably handles this dilemma and provides a compelling framework for research into 
the complexity of sexuality employed as a model of development. Yet, even when the 
Action Group focuses on the collaborative notion of shared language nowhere is sexuality 
understood as already distorting an understanding of the conditions the group hopes to 
ameliorate, namely political economic conditions and the rights and agency of women.  
I am not arguing that sexuality should be disassociated from sex, but that local 
“sex” and pleasure may not be translatable to the researchers‟ invocation of sexuality in 
the name of the women they are advocating for. Can we listen more closely?  Can we 
also attend to pleasure and affections that speak to local, lived experiences without 
hauling out sexuality to coordinate every pleasurable meaning? For example, in the essay 
“Not Like Our Mothers,” Simone Grilo Diniz, Cecilia De Mello E Souza, and Paula 
Portella further explain how the categorical separation of work, labor, reproduction, and 
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sexuality is not always applicable to working populations they interview who view little 
to no distinction between the work of cleaning houses, the work of raising families, and 
the work of “sexual relations” (Diniz et al 1998). This point foregrounds the body as a 
“working instrument,” whereas Western separate spheres of sexuality and labor do not 
account (in fact romantically refuse) this lived reality. One woman details her life of 
work: “I had no youth because I got married at eighteen and life became routine. Work, 
heat your belly at the stove and chill it at the sink. That is all you learn. Move, chicken! 
Shut up, boy! Today many things are changing, but for me nothing changed. It is always 
the same—field, home, kids, wash…” (1998:46). This points to a need to  disengage 
sexuality in queer anthropology and for realizing that pleasure may still be an instrument 
of labor and work and exchange (even when invoking sex as a pleasurable act between 
consenting agents) and may still operate as something not pleasurable in another context.  
Similarly, Adriana Ortiz Ortega, Ana Amuchástegui, and Marta Rivas in 
“Because They Were Born From Me” (Ortega et al 1998) detail sex as a male-initiated 
and male-dominated domain of pleasure, as reported by Mexican female informants. The 
authors keenly detail how sex and sexuality is not translatable, or cross-cultural, or a 
discrete realm of negotiated sexual pleasures between consenting parties. This disturbs a 
call for global sexual rights that speaks for women, men, and others by illuminating the 
contradictory (and not always evident) ways sexual pleasure is considered an aspect of 
the self. Like a local informant reported “I think that rights must be personal and not 
because someone comes and tells you, „These are you rights‟; that‟s like he is ordering 
something, right? We women have to say: „This is my right and this I have to do…‟” 
(Ortega et al 1998:172). So, if we attempt to advocate for sexual rights, as sexuality, are 
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we enforcing norms of sexual pleasure that are not cross-cultural, not personal, and not 
local? Are we, in essence, demanding a global ideal of sexual pleasure? The categories of 
Western life and meaning do not always neatly map in all places, and the fundamental 
understanding of pleasure, affection, and intimacy may not neatly map across space 
within Western culture or across cultures, as queer theory makes clear.  
In the context of global campaigns and local agencies, when research assumes sex 
as an autonomous right to pleasure we may also ignore the ways local agents report sex 
as a burden of social labor, or of limited pleasures, or even as tangential to self-
understanding. As Laura Ahearn makes clear in Invitations to Love: Literacy, Love 
Letters and Social Change in Nepal (2001) what cultural subjects say and feel may be 
quite different, and depending on the context, quite distinct. She notes how ideals of 
individualism and romantic love were established and circulated along with the ideals and 
programs of economic development.  Do we then demand that sex always be pleasurable 
in the way we need it to be? In this regard, when various programs administered by the 
World Health Organization, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund and 
other non-governmental agencies invoke sexuality as a necessary and obvious element of 
human rights, they may do so in ignorance of the way pleasure is not necessarily 
composed of the same choices in the assumed universal market of pleasure.  
 In summary, Sex in Development (Adams and Pigg 2005) and Negotiating 
Reproductive Rights: Women’s Perspectives Across Countries and Cultures (Petchesky 
and Judd 1998) critically inquire how sex and sexuality are introduced and employed in 
economic development programs. They ask how programs of development rely on the 
supposedly stable, scientific conceptions of sex and sexuality that, in turn, assume an 
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absence of particular moralities. They argue instead that a stance on normal sexuality 
already assumes Western codes of sex—albeit a moral code that assumes a “healthy” 
sexuality as normal sexuality. Adams and Pigg foreground criticism of sexuality‟s 
supposed “naturalness,” but they still unfortunately aim to produce a usable and 
productive conception of sexuality that will address local moralities within development 
programs. As the editors remind: “all sexualities are local” (Adams and Pigg 2005:5). 
But, as I argue, sexuality is never local but pleasures, affections, and bodies may be.  
 
Queer Anthropology, Without Sexuality 
  Manolo Guzman (2006) critiques the notion that gayness, homosexuality, and 
same-sex desire are mutually intelligible. In Gay Hegemony/Latino Homosexualities, 
Guzman demonstrates that same-sex desires in the New York, Puerto-Rican diaspora 
navigate and negotiate around a “long duree” of gay history (2006:1). He complicates the 
idea that a gay subject emerges in similar ways, always in the heart of the city (2006:1). 
He implicates an older racial typology of “the one drop rule” to understand the emphasis 
in gay culture for stable sexualities (2006:91). In other words, one touch, one “sex act,” 
one momentary or continuous pleasure is the one-drop that proves a latent, closeted 
homosexuality yearning to be gay. It is unfortunate that he relies so explicitly on 
“homosexualities,” though, to arrive at his very necessary point. He must understand that 
this use of sexuality-based categories enforces an idealized orientation toward object-
choice and ignores its long complex history, even when pluralized to homosexualities and 
contrasted with gay. Nevertheless, Guzman‟s evaluation of the conservative tendencies of 
Western GLBT political programs, and the shadow it casts over those bodies not at the 
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center of the assumed cosmopolitan sexual constellation are important for future queer 
anthropological research.   
 Specifically, queering GLBT political programs reveals how global political 
research too often simply harmonizes sexuality with a need for freedom of choice, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of lifeway. This ignores material dimensions of 
political economy, race, and class. Mainstream GLBT politics operate within a sexual 
schema that recognizes sexuality (as sexual identity) as necessary evidence of a universal, 
essential human condition. In other words, to make “sexuality” into sexual identity, and 
thus a human right imperative within global development and social research, GLBT 
organizations must accept a logic that runs counter to expressions to more material and 
political choices. These organizations give life to sexuality as “not a choice” within 
human life. Then, paradoxically, this naturalized, universal condition is primed for sexual 
identification and assumed waiting and ready at the core of human sexual subjectivity, if 
only one had more social choices. This is what queer anthropology must navigate and 
overcome.  
Adam Kuper (2003) follows a similar essentialist dilemma when researching new 
claims of “indigenous rights.” He notes how indigenous groups in Canada resuscitated 
outmoded anthropological ideas about cultural permanence and ethnic difference to 
establish land-rights claims in Canadian courts. This is useful to my argument because 
queer anthropologists must traverse similar knowledge about the social construction of 
sexual identities, and strategic claims that sexual identities as categories of practice are 
universal, natural born orientations. But we can and should also look to a more 
thoroughgoing ground about bodies and pleasures to build other ideas about “rights” (if 
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we want to use that term, at all). For example, we can claim all bodies and pleasures hold 
some salience for rights discourse, or we could instead focus theoretical attention to more 
generalizable affections and alliances, regardless of any conception of orientation. In 
either case, as Kuper notes, “It is a good idea to call people by names they recognize and 
find acceptable. Nevertheless, discredited, old arguments may lurk behind new words” 
(2003:389). This queer dilemma of enjoining universal categories (say, supporting 
economic development rationale in the name of sexuality, or arguing for sexual rights in 
the name of sexuality and freedom) clash with other research that supports more queer 
ideas of agency, interventions in local politics, or where the idea of choice may be more 
politically effective. These are crucial questions that organize the edited anthology 
Different Rainbows (Drucker 2001) and Tropics of Desire: Interventions from Queer 
Latin America (Quiroga 2000). 
 Drucker pays particular attention to the dissonance between the “First-World” 
gay/lesbian identities and the same-sex cultures and identities in, what he names, the 
“Third-World.” He notes, “men in the Third World who have sex with men, and women 
who have sex with women, have their own more or less distinct traditions, realities, 
sexualities, and identities, which neither they nor outside observers always even see as 
„lesbian‟ or „gay‟” (2001:207). Drucker‟s unease, though, is not necessarily about 
criticizing “gay or lesbian,” but to figure how we build a movement that addresses all 
those who are sexually oppressed. He aims to recognize the limits of social research and 
political movements that only articulate a limited range of sexual identities with a 
backdrop of relatively stable, capitalistic economies. Drucker struggles, on the other 
hand, to figure what terms to use to accomplish such a task. He employs the concept of 
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sexual cultures, then uses same-sex identities, and then relies on sexualities. Sexuality is 
the least rewarding as it leaves out transgender, sex work, and sexual behavior that cannot 
be neatly categorized within sexual identity. Sexual cultures, at least, provide a ground 
for analysis. He queerly contests hegemonic sexual rights movements that only organize 
those willing to speak in similar terms, and in similar ways, while ignoring the political 
economic conditions that motivate sexual oppression in the first place. Throughout his 
writing I longed for him to eliminate sexuality altogether as is clashes with his quest for a 
sexual rights movement that pays attention to political economy. This is complicated by 
sexuality that I argue is already a classed and gendered economic philosophy of the body 
and its pleasures. 
 José Quiroga (2000) similarly critiques the notion of a universal set of sexual 
identities, with similar needs and affections and built from an ideal of sexuality. He 
criticizes the imperatives of contemporary sexuality: the demand for sexual identity and 
social sexual visibility, the notion that homosexuality can be a useful category in all 
places (even in the West), and the ideal that sexuality is always a struggle for an accurate 
self-inspection. Sexuality, too, must always be composed with an object-choice and this 
obviously troubles Quiroga; he explicitly avoids pronouncing sexuality throughout the 
text, though he lapses into a pluralized sexualities. He pointedly asks “What use is there 
for a queer studies that does not articulate a critique of class?” (2000:233). In this way he 
focuses attention on Latin American artists, writers, and activists who eschew explicit 
demands for self-revelatory sexuality and swap more coded political and social 
interventions. He argues that a demand for public articulations of sexuality serves to 
stabilize oppressive political regimes by speaking in similar terms and this ignores the 
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varying ways people forge alliances and resistance across sexual cultures. He hopes to 
enjoin research and cultural criticism that “goes beyond identity” and, as I desire, beyond 
an ideal of sexuality. Several other researchers also attempt to negotiate this queer 
dilemma. I address each of these final texts with the goal of articulating new pathways for 
queer interventions, away from the sexuality. I then address how each miss intellectual 
opportunities with their use of sexuality.  
 Anthropologist Tom Boellstorff offers a “queer” reading and hopes to offer new 
theoretical possibilities for research in The Gay Archipelago: Sexuality and Nation in 
Indonesia (2005) and A Coincidence of Desire: Anthropology, Queer Studies, Indonesia 
(2007a), Martin V. Manalansan attempts similar work in Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men 
in the Diaspora (2003), and Elizabeth Povinelli articulates new ways of interpreting 
liberal and neoliberal dilemmas of belonging, intimacy, and affection in Empire of Love: 
Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality (2003).  
 How can queer anthropology build an account of pleasure, affection, and intimacy 
that accounts for the multiple and overlapping contingencies of social life? Queer 
anthropology attempts to account for both culture and enculturation, both the social and 
radical social agency. Queer anthropologists and researchers attempt to account for social 
constructions of sexual identity and also a personal accounting of how these constructions 
fail to attest to lived, material realities, pleasures, and affections. Perhaps most 
importantly, queer anthropologists must address social inequities and categories of 
normalcy with a nuanced research program that maintains radical and disruptive political 
criticism. The task at hand is to build an account of human sexual subjectivity that points 
in these queer directions—without sexuality.  
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 Boellstorff offers an account of gay and lesbi Indonesians. He addresses the 
necessity of intersectional, cultural analysis within a study of sexuality in the Indonesian 
archipelago (2005). Boellstorff notes that an “Indonesian” ethnography does not exist for 
a number of distinctive reasons: primarily the geographic reach and local knowledge of 
island inhabitants renders “Indonesia” a conceptual problem. Second, national citizens do 
not always primarily identify with the nation as a central feature of identity. Third, 
anthropological knowledge has not produced a text that conceives its local subjects as 
“Indonesian.” He then offers the lesbi and gay citizen as a newly realized national 
subject, not reduced to the sole product of globalization and global economic 
development. He does so to understand how local forms of identity are intersectional and, 
therefore, how Indonesian lesbi and gay citizens understand themselves within local, 
regional, and international cultural logics. He contrasts this to cultural analyses that over-
emphasize powerful institutional productions, which he argues flatten accounts of 
individual subjectivity and erode local knowledge in service of theorizing an abstract 
“discourse.” He offers instead an intersectional analysis that renders sexuality very well 
meaningless, but then he assumes that without sexuality his other exceptional points are 
unintelligible.  
 Boellstorff‟s ethnographic project aims to render queer anthropologically viable. 
He recognizes the ways sexuality, gender, and other sexed categories are impossible to 
negotiate as discrete, separate, local forms. While his informants do position themselves 
with full knowledge of global sexual identity movements (evidenced in lesbi and gay 
terminology), he argues that local life is not so entirely different from the gay and lesbian 
subject positions profoundly shaped by the psychological and sexological discourses in 
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the West (2005). But in doing so he assumes a stability of sexuality and sexual identity at 
“home” to then complicate the notion of sexuality abroad. He also assumes that the 
rational, consumer-oriented, masculinist logic already embedded in Western ideals of 
sexuality operates much more tidily than I would argue it does.  
 People negotiate, resist, and transform identity “there,” and here. Boellstorff 
creatively argues though for theorizing “queer time” by calling attention to the ways time 
already operates in “straight” ways (2005). For example, assessing queer time is to 
reimagine other ways of being in the world through emphasizing life‟s dis-junctures of 
identity. Queer timing foregrounds the ways that life does not always flow according to 
timely planning. Yet, straight time is never actually followed, as human subjectivity 
works in queer time already. Human cultural models are, of course, indispensable to 
human culture, but accounts of individual agency often point to slippages as well as 
outright resistance. That is a departure point for creating new theories of queer human 
subjectivity and agency. Humans are already queer, already non-conforming to an extent, 
one need to just look—perhaps askew—at what already is being culturally offered, 
performed, and resisted. 
 Boellstorff notes how sexuality studies often self-congratulate while recognizing 
the linguistic and historical constructions of sexual categories (2005). Boellstorff 
critiques the supposed and obvious benefit of such recognition by complicating the 
portrait of a “globalized” sexuality. He claims that sexuality is neither entirely a Western 
conception of the self, nor a reduction of local expressions of self separate from other 
types of belonging. In other words, an assumption continues in sexual cultural studies 
that local forms of sexuality are either exclusively local or entirely subsumed by 
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globalized discourse of sexual identity. As Boellstorff makes explicit, cultural and social 
processes are never tidy, and they do not need to be.  
Sexuality need not be a singular domain moving along a single axis. Boellstorff 
reminds readers that research should not confuse analytical and experiential categories, 
similar to reducing sexuality to “sexual culture” and assuming it contains a discrete, 
independent logic existing separate from other parts of culture (2005). Yet, as a matter of 
convenience, a matter of interpretation, and a matter of writing, “sexuality” still remains a 
primary and discretely employed term within his effort. This exemplifies both the 
difficulty of his work (which he clearly recognizes) and the difficulty of escaping the 
imprimatur where sexuality makes pleasure, affection, and the body meaningful to 
readers, students, politics, and activists at home. Also, queer anthropological studies may 
need to express sexual cultures more in terms of similitude than difference, in this way 
others materialist ideas about pleasure, affection, and intimacy may move to the center of 
our analyses. The discourse of identity, sexual rights, and other ideas of human 
subjectivity need not move along an axis of sexuality. It could root in pleasure, the body, 
and change—perhaps both radically inclusive and cross-culturally meaningful? 
Boellstorff attempts a similar aim about cultural coincidences that may be productive for 
queer studies. 
 Anthropology can theorize, not just detail queer life Boellstorff claims in 
Coincidence of Desires: Anthropology, Queer Studies, Indonesia (2007a). In other words, 
Boellstorff asks how “queering” may interrupt, alter, and reconfigure cultural notions of 
time, belonging, and space in both theoretical and practical ways. To queer is to make 
strange, to make linkages, and to make the seeming coincidences of life more readily 
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available to anthropological understanding. Queer theory can illuminate distinctive 
domains of gender, sexuality, and a “sexed body,” but he troubles these distinctions and 
pointedly questions the anthropological utility of these formulas. In a discussion of 
tomboys, femmes, lesbis, and “transvestites,” Boellstorff notices the intertwined 
knowledge that render each intelligible in their local and national (and international) 
contexts. In this way, Boellstorff further argues that queer should encompass an 
intertwined range of understanding about non-normative identities. This may further the 
possibilities of imagining and engaging in queer political interventions, yet to claim a 
category of “non-normative sexualities” limits our critique of sexuality as always, already 
necessary. To make linkages between the non-normative subjects he covers also assumes 
that each pleasurable act, bodily movement, and expression must be categorically defined 
as non-normative to take on queer political importance. Queering also imagines bodies, 
pleasures, and agency that never fall within the surveillance of cultural expressions of 
recognizable identity. In other words, people can kiss, hug, touch, fuck, embrace, caress, 
and love without coherent and stable meaning at all. It may simply be—a coincidence of 
bodies, pleasures, and desires.  
Manalansan (2003), on the other hand, focuses on the shifting terrains of political 
economy, migration, and queer identity. Queer, or gay and lesbian, can be conceived as 
both liberation from and submission to a modernist, liberalizing world order. In this way, 
to claim a sexual identity, inspired by Western sexual politics, does not necessarily mean 
that local life and individual expression is somehow moot. Manalansan pays particular 
attention to the “micropolitics” of personal identity within the lives of “gay” Filipino 
migrants living in the diasporic communities of New York City. Manalansan sufficiently 
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problematizes the conception of “Pride Without Borders” (the theme of NYC GLBTQ 
Pride celebration in 1996). This theme imagines an American emancipation of sexual 
identity extended throughout the world in a similar fashion. In this way we must contend 
with the idea that the “outside” world is pre-modern (primitive, yet again). Despite this 
criticism, Manalansan curiously posits his ethnography as a monograph to enable a 
“global gayness.”  
He declares an alliance with what he names “new queer studies,” which he sees as 
scholars specifically concerned with the political stakes of pronouncing a vision of the 
“global” while recognizing that this need not reduce local agency and local 
understanding. He does not make room, however, for pleasures, bodies, and agency that 
may desire all he celebrates, yet never desire and identify with his global gayness or 
gayness at all. Sexuality, in his work, takes on various local forms, but is also understood 
to prepare us for a vision of global solidarity. I do not devalue his ethnographic project 
and meticulous work, but I question why his account of micropolitics does not account 
for the vastly different ways cultural subjects experience and seek out pleasure, and for 
what material purposes, if any.  
It is certainly credible to research the global political projects of both his 
informants and his own. Yet global political projects that aim for sexual sovereignty and 
sexual alliances may not actually achieve the bulk of their aims if sexual is only 
understood through an ideal of sexuality. There are more bodies, more pleasures, and 
more affective alliances operating even in the lives and loves of those who claim 
solidarity with global gayness. I think this is necessary to note in queer research. It is not 
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just what we say we do, it also what we do. Queer anthropologists can assess that in ways 
that queer theorists, alone, have struggled to address in material and lived ways.  
Global gayness celebrates a fantasy, and it still may be a useful and necessary one. 
But we should avoid a fantasy based solely on a consumptive oriented world without 
borders, whereas borders are entirely real when one has limited means and little political 
viability for crossing them. Sexuality continually constructs the same economic borders 
around bodies and pleasures that he hopes to undermine when he critiques the economic 
fantasies of “gay modernity.” In any case, to maintain sexuality even as a contested 
framework obscures some of the economic inequities he is concerned with. Sexuality 
does not adequately offer a vision of a sexual subject actively forming alliances, adapting 
to changes, and discovering new material life ways and new pleasures. Sexuality 
imagines desire without social agency except for the classed and gendered subject 
sexuality is built for (as I noted in Chapter 2). Even “global gayness” needs a more 
diverse and active agent than that. His use of sexuality orders an organization of class, 
gender, and desire that does not do justice to his own wonderful descriptions of his 
informants.  I turn now to a recent examination of Western life, and the ways the author  
conceives of bodies and pleasures, without sexuality. 
 Elizabeth Povinelli (2006) examines liberal and neoliberal ideologies of 
belonging that depend on irreducible tensions in Western political economic life. She 
explores the way settlers (indigenous people in northern Australia, and Radical Faeries in 
the United States) inhabit and negotiate liberal ideals mapped for the body. Her primary 
objective is to understand the way intimacy and constraint are idealized and understood 
in different societies, yet somehow remain synchronized across liberal zones of social 
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order. Povinelli explicitly (and I argue queerly) avoids reference to “identity” and to 
sexuality as an explicit, a priori category. She does note that “sexuality” is determined by 
where and when it is constructed, but in relation to ideas of intimacy and within the 
governing of a liberal society. She does so to encourage other, queerer ways of thinking 
about the “social matrix.”  How does identity takes shape in liberal discourses that seek to 
establish norms of intimacy and, thus, containment?   
 Povinelli seeks to explain how intimacy is animated through autological 
knowledge (the assumed self-making subject in liberalism) and genealogical knowledge 
(the constraints, regulations, and “inheritance” of our historical knowledge); this is 
another articulation of the queer dilemma. She offers a theory of carnality and intimacy 
instead of sexuality—a provocative vision of pleasure, affection, and agency, while still 
addressing the limitations ordered in contemporary life. In her work she recognizes the 
ongoing dissonance of producing thick descriptions of “thick life.” She argues that life is 
too rich, too thick, to be represented with anemic theories of sexual or gender identity and 
that we need a political program where the density of “social representation is increased 
to meet the density of actual social worlds” (Povinelli 2006:21). To understand human 
subjectivity, queerly, is to understand a people within their skin, to account for feelings 
that emerge, merge, and conflict across the surface of lived experiences, felt by the body, 
and lived through the tensions, sensations, and releases of life.  
 In contrast, sexuality rarely offers an interpretation of carnality other than as a 
problem of intimacy. Sexuality is thus far too blunt a register. It is built as an ideal for a 
heteronormative, male, rational consumer subject. It is built out of class struggle and 
social anxiety, and the very same struggles that some now hope to theorize ways out of 
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by deploying sexuality. But sexuality cannot capture the passions, the fluidity, the 
pleasures, and the thick resistances that queer anthropological theorizing hopes to 
imagine. Peter Hitchcock (2003) extrapolates Arjun Appuradai‟s notion that resistance to 
hegemonic and oppressive elements springs from the process of imagination. So, as much 
as nations are imagined, as much as sexualities are imagined, as much as the 
“naturalness” of specific sexual orders are imagined, so too must the possibilities of 
resistance be imagined.  
 The challenge for queer anthropological studies is to recognize the way these 
orders are asserted on the body. It is to also recognize the impact on the individual 
“being” as social agent, and then first imagine strategies for resistance (Hitchcock 2003). 
We must resist propositions of sexuality as indicative of modern freedom and equity. We 
must counter this with the knowledge that a sexualized citizenry is already framed within 
limited horizons of affection, intimacy, pleasure, and thus political possibility. 
Admirably, Povinelli (2006) attempts a beginning at this charge, at this counter-attack 
(Foucault 1978:157).  
 Finally, and perhaps the most perplexing queer dilemma of all, how can queer 
anthropology imagine possibilities for pleasure, intimacy, affection, and agency when the 
notion of a desiring rationality is already constructed as heterosexual, masculine, and 
normative—as sexuality? Material evidence of rational life-making, in pleasure, 
intimacy, and affection is stridently denied in contemporary sexual politics. Theories of 
material rationality are, ironically, rejected by sexual liberationists who laud sexual 
difference and diversity, but only if they are able to register these differences as 
sexuality—only if they “are born that way.”  
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 What can it look like, what will it feel like, what political possibilities, and what 
queer anthropology is possible if this queer dilemma is no longer a dilemma? What new 
intellectual pathways may emerge when sexuality is rejected? What new ethical pathways 
will emerge when queerness is embraced, not as an identity, but as a matter of 
contestation, fluidity, change, fairness, pleasure and each understood as potent evidence 
of rational thinking, ethical living, and active social agency? Queer, indeed. It is useful to 
remember here that the richness of anthropological knowledge is built upon the desire for 
holism, not on mechanical descriptions and hypotheses. Humans turn to other humans not 
to make sense of the natural world in atomic specificity, but to make sense of a 
spectacular range of emotion, expression, and cultural logic. Similarly, Gayle Rubin 
offers that “the complexity of cuisines is no testament to the belly‟s hunger” (1984). 
Queer anthropology may provide the possibility for exploring sex in all its contentious, 
problematic, sublime, pleasurable, and disagreeable bearings. These final questions 
provide ground for me to address Out in Theory: The Emergence of Gay and Lesbian 
Anthropology (Leap & Lewin 2002).  
 Leap and Lewin (2002) make a claim about the necessity and validity of research 
on sexual cultures. They may work from a problematic assumption that anthropology 
formerly repressed knowledge about sexuality (Rubin 2011:354-355). Vital work that 
aims to restore sex to its proper place in the house of anthropology (Weston 1998) 
narrates an emphasis on loss, then a recovery of knowledge. This narrative manages the 
story of sexual knowledge too closely to an ideal of repression; Foucault noted repression 
was a hypothesis to produce, among other sentiments, a feeling of radicalism (Foucault 
1978). The story of our “repression,” ironically gives life to sexuality and restricts other 
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possibilities for acknowledging bodies and pleasures. I note this to bolster my critique of 
Leap and Lewin‟s outstanding, but problematic, Out in Theory (2002).  
During the last three decades a necessary and not always welcome development 
of gay and lesbian anthropology changed the way anthropology addressed sex, 
theoretically, ethnographically, and within the discipline‟s professional practices. Leap 
and Lewin certainly honor the tradition of anthropology as a necessary political 
orientation, as well as a necessary academic discipline. They address the anthropological 
crisis between the relation of anthropology and its subjects; they provide space for 
feminist interrogations of a pervasive androcentric bias in the discipline, and they 
positively evaluate the critical stances of postmodernism, postcolonial studies, and 
cultural studies (Leap and Lewin 2002:1-2). This supports the anthropological 
introduction I offer in this chapter, but from this agreement we part company.  
I find it instructive to paraphrase Donald Kulick‟s review of Leap and Lewin‟s 
earlier work Out in the Field: Reflections of Gay and Lesbian Anthropologists (1996), 
which Leap and Lewin criticize in the introduction of their follow-up work Out in Theory 
(2002). Kulick expressed concern about their specific focus on gay and lesbian 
professionals “coming out,” and the political ramifications of pursuing gender and 
sexuality research. He argued this produced substantial barriers to younger 
anthropologists identifying and applying newer, queerer paradigms in anthropological 
research. Leap and Lewin defend their well-received collection in light of his charge. I 
find Leap and Lewin‟s volume to be important: it helps students and scholars understand 
anthropological disciplinary history and academic sexual politics. Yet Kulick‟s critique is 
well-founded, and I argue that the exclusive focus on an emergence of “gay and lesbian” 
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anthropology does work to limit queer research. In response to Kulick, Leap and Lewin 
argue that queer connections to anthropology were and still are under-developed. They 
maintain that queer scholarship is notoriously anti-empirical, and that queer is an 
“inclusive, generic focus” and thus not helpful. Leap and Lewin also reason that when 
preparing their text there were absolutely no anthropologists willing to address the 
connection between queer theory and anthropology (Leap and Lewin 2002:10-12). With 
this dismissive coverage I can make one assumption as to why.  
The right for scholars to identify as gendered and sexual beings certainly should 
not limit opportunity in the professional academy. These identifications, however, do not 
necessarily produce a more inclusive anthropological perspective on theory and practice, 
by default. Anthropologists must also consider the theoretical, practical, and ethnographic 
limits of this emphasis. Gay and lesbian-identified people obviously produce vital, 
critical work within social and cultural research. Yet limiting “queer” or any other study 
of pleasure, affection, and agency under a mantle of “gay and lesbian” considerably over 
determines the necessity of Western social and sexual categories. Sexuality, as a 
category, cannot be linked with the criticism I offer here if we already assume that our 
social systems of identification are always politically, if not anthropologically, necessary. 
Therefore Leap and Lewin‟s framing of sexual identity categories, sexuality, and sexual 
orientation should be considered as problematic as an androcentric bias or homophobic 
panic in academic life and in the production of our vital research. 
 I am not positing that homophobia, gender bias, and a general sex-phobia do not 
regulate and restrain social and cultural research. I agree they do. But anthropological 
analysis, queer ethnographic practice, and culture theory is not made more proper or 
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more imaginative when our political beliefs, invested in sexuality, also launch our 
anthropological studies. The categories of gay and lesbian or straight, and categories of 
homosexual or heterosexual, each proceed from a belief and investment in maintaining, 
without question, the idea of sexuality as the premier and necessary ground from which 
to orient anthropological knowledge of pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency. 
Leap and Lewin nobly argue that “coming out” de-stigmatizes anthropological 
research into gay and lesbian life and homosexuality and heterosexuality (1996, 2002). 
There is valuable work to be made by investing in studies where these categories align 
within identified communities and their categories of practice (as I noted earlier in this 
chapter). This still limits new research questions and limits knowledge on human sexual 
subjectivity (in any case, I am still waiting for a rich, nuanced study of upper-class, 
white, “heterosexuals”). In fairness, Leap and Lewin partially address this difficulty by 
noting that local terms for gay and lesbian practice should be included in ethnography. 
This though does not produce insight into the question I already problematize: how are 
these local terms not equivalencies, and how does this offer new ways to understand 
human sexual subjectivity in all its forms? Leap and Lewin imagine that without 
sexuality, and without gay and lesbian categories, a quagmire of descriptive relativism 
will ensue (2002:9). This is a necessary consideration in social and cultural research. But, 
I argue, that we should jump into this quagmire and reassess the historical notions that 
sustain “sexuality” as an immaterial frame for pleasures and affections within queer 
anthropology before assuming relativism will be the obvious result.  
In any case, Leap and Lewin do not address how these ideals of sexuality and 
sexual identity occlude an understanding of overlapping “sexual worlds,” which Gayle 
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Rubin calls for (1984). I like this finer point, because it does not reduce everything to an 
estimation of “non-normative” sexual study, and this too is where queer theory often 
breaks down. Too often the lines of normative and non-normative categorizations 
resurrect sexuality without questioning it, in the first place. To queer anthropology and to 
anthropologize queer theory is to de-stabilize the strict limits that sexuality conjures, 
including the ideal of non-normative. In this way, everyone is a little bit queer, as the 
saying goes.  
We must fully interrogate the limits sexuality engineers as a category of analysis, 
if not always as a category of practice. We need to reinvigorate the study of material 
pleasures and affections. We need to more adequately assess how normative and non-
normative, homosexual and heterosexual, and gay and lesbian all corral insights about the 
body and pleasure into a dull sexuality. This limits our material and political perspectives 
on human sexual subjectivity. We need to imagine a human sexual subjectivity motivated 
with agency, political intervention, belonging, and performing dynamic human affections 
and intimacies within and across sexual cultures.  
In conclusion, Gayle Rubin notes how the use of theories of social construction 
“refined the theoretical bases for social approaches to sexual behavior” and inspired a 
“vast outpouring of work that has continuously destabilized universal sexual categories 
and increasingly placed sexualities in history, society, and culture” (Rubin 2002:43). So, 
a vibrant transformation in the intellectual knowledge of sexual categories occurred, now 
why not sexuality? Queer anthropology is a vehicle where vibrant transformations can 
continue to occur, and we can and should push further. Tobias Rees asks how to “invent 
new ways of being an anthropologist or ethnographer” in a world where anthropology 
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can “no longer make assumptions about what is necessary for their method to produce 
rich ethnographic data—a temporally stable scene and subject of study” (Marcus and 
Rabinow et al 2008:7). It is to continually ask the question: “What is anthropology today? 
What could it be?” (2008:8). James D. Faubion further inquires in Designs for an 
Anthropology of the Contemporary (Marcus and Rabinow et al 2008): 
In the aftermath of a devastating critique, identity was to organize a lot of 
people‟s projects as a kind of sun around which a variety of often quite politically 
inflected interests could orbit together. Multiple currents of feminism, for 
instance, were, in fact, quite productive in attaching themselves to the same sort 
of orbit. It brought in gay and lesbian studies, which seemed to me to hold the 
promise of being the next great force of the undoing of humanist essentialism. 
Unfortunately, it hasn‟t accomplished very much in anthropology. It is limited 
work, and I‟m not quite certain why. [Marcus and Rabinow et al 2008:34] 
 
Queer anthropology may answer the question by providing a necessary flexibility for this 
project. Queer anthropologists may also provide strategies and methods for imagining 
human sexual subjectivity that allows for diverse ideas of pleasures and affections, 
identities and non-identities, material practices and ideal relations. We must be willing to 
revisit and interrogate our own theoretical presumptions. In doing so, sexuality and 
“sexual freedom, identity, openness, and individual rights” (Engebretsen 2008:88) need 
not be the most commanding forces in queer anthropological studies of bodies and 
pleasures. We can create a queer anthropology—without sexuality. 
109 
 
    Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
The social construction of sexuality is not a novel claim (Foucault 1978). But I 
hoped to emphasize how the political economic background of a history of sexuality is 
often forgotten. Calls for economic justice, studies on the globalization of sexuality, and 
cross-cultural research on material sexuality are all hampered by ignoring this history of 
sexuality‟s construction. In this thesis I argued that sexuality was invented and 
constructed to manage social economic anxieties. This crucial point is too often 
understated or ignored in research that similarly attempts to understand the parallel 
between economic literature, sexology, and sexuality. Sexuality was developed with a 
rational, male, self-interested economic subject as the normative standard from which all 
other affections, pleasures, and intimacies were judged.  
Sexologists invented categories of non-normative affections and pleasures to 
assert how differences expressed by bodies and pleasures were social problems needing 
to be rectified. The category of sexuality was refined as a commentary on the bodies of 
laboring classes, migrants, and women. By critically examining how sexuality developed 
in parallel to neoclassical economic philosophy, which was already rooted with a 
classical economic male subjectivity, I hoped to show that economic ideas paralleled and 
aided the construction of a sexological human subjectivity. In the least, I hoped to further 
elaborate on the economic pedigree of sexuality. Studies that do not take this history into 
account often problematically assert the universality of sexuality as a meaningful 
category of analysis with little attention to it as an economic philosophy of the body.  
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I think that employing other categories of analysis may help us imagine other 
ways to theorize bodies and pleasures. I hope this moves us along new research 
pathways. This is evident in the merging of queer theory and anthropology. I assess this 
merger because it is producing new research questions and new ways to address bodies, 
pleasures, affections, and intimacies. Anthropological research on sex already maintains a 
keen awareness of the culturally specific constructions of sex. Social and cultural 
anthropology also offers methodologies that allow us to grapple with the real, material 
conditions of people‟s lives, as they are lived. Queer theories re-frame and radicalize 
social knowledge of sex, gender, and politics. Queer theorists generally propose human 
sexual subjectivity as valiantly exceeding the limits of social control. To “queer,” 
therefore, is to assess how human subjects engage in ongoing, active resistance to social 
norms and social limitations.  
This recent queer anthropological work offers a productive collaboration between 
cultural theory, queer theory, and ethnography. But sexuality is a roadblock in this queer 
anthropological collaboration. I hoped to show that a historical and social constructionist 
account of sexuality that critiques neoclassical economic subjectivity may help us 
imagine new pathways for understanding and pursuing research on affection, pleasure, 
intimacy, and social agency. The category of sexuality orders and limits political 
economic, anthropological, and queer interpretations of bodies and pleasures and thus 
human subjectivity. In this sense, I push queer anthropology further by critiquing the 
continued use of sexuality in this vital research. I maintain that we can build a queer 
anthropology—without sexuality. 
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